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A LAWYER’S INTRODUCTION TO SMART CONTRACTS
Samuel Bourque
Sara Fung Ling Tsui
Abstract
Smart contracts  represent some of the most exciting breakthroughs following Bitcoin and
Blockchain-based  technologies.  However,  much  of  the  discussion  has  been  around  the
technical aspects with the actual legal and practical implications left vague. This discussion
bridges  the  gap between the  legal  world  and the  upcoming  crypto-economy that  will  be
shaped  by  Smart  Contracts  and  proposed  Decentralized  Autonomous  Organizations;  and
composes a cursory examination of the legal implications of Smart Contracts:
(1) what are Smart Contracts?
(2) are Smart Contracts considered contracts in law?
(3) what are practical uses for Smart Contracts?
(4) can Smart Contracts opt-out of the legal system?
(5) are DAO/DACs outside of courts' jurisdiction?
Keywords
Smart Contracts, cryptocurrencies, technology, bitcoin, legal policy
1. Smart Contracts
1.1. The Short Answer
Simply put, a Smart Contract (“SC”) is a self-executing contract. To wit, SCs are just like
traditional paper contracts drafted in natural human language only that SCs specifically are
drafted electronically in a computer interpretable language. The important effect is that the
computer system that interprets the SC can execute some of the terms of the contract.1
The nearest analogy for a SC in the traditional view is that of an executor (in the older sense
—not its probate definition); or in a more modern sense, an administrator or a servicer of a
contract.
An appropriate analogy for the reader to envision would be that of two masters that share a
servant;  the  latter  has  the  ability  to  read  and is  bound to  obey both  his  masters’ signed
instructions. When the two masters draft and sign an agreement; the servant, upon receipt of
the written contract, would oversee and perform the contractual obligations through to the
contract’s termination. To draw the parallel back to SCs, the masters are the parties to the
contract and the SC is the servant that executes the contract obligations.
1.2. Pure Smart Contracts vs. Smart Contracts Lite
Not all SCs are created equal—some are “smarter” than others. There are three perpendicular
axes to consider:
(1) the level of automation of the execution of the contract;
(2) the extent of separation between the actual agreed upon terms and the executed code; and
finally
1 For  more  information,  please  visit:  http://szabo.best.vwh.net/contractlanguage.html;  N.  Szabo,  A  Formal
Language for Analyzing Contracts, 2002.
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(3) the custodial rights and/or discretion of the SC and its execution from the parties.
Firstly, let’s discuss the level of automation: there long have been many contracts for which
its terms in part have been established in computer-executable code. Such examples are: any
online merchant,2 for which manual interaction is needed—e.g. shipping; conversely, data-
only online merchants may be fully automatable as there may be no manual  intervention
required for the transaction to clear.
Secondly, let’s go over the distinction between the actual contract and the SC. Generally in an
online vendor scenario, the actual contract is an adhesion contract spelled out by the terms of
use  and/or  terms  and  conditions  on  the  website’s  sitemap,  or  on  purchase  confirmation
display. The code executing the contract is then separate from the actual terms; and hence may
be disjoint in a few separate ways—one could presume skewed in the vendor’s favor, given
the lack of transparency.
This leads to the third issue—regarding the custodian of the code. In keeping with the analogy
of an online retailer, the code resides within the merchant’s control; furthermore, the customer
may never  have a  chance to  review or audit  it  at  any time.  Understandably,  most  online
customers may not have the level of sophistication to review—or even want to review—such
code. However, with the status quo, a customer sophisticated in the ability to understand code
and/or with a specialized need would scarcely be given authorization to audit the merchant’s
code. This is not for nefarious reasons, but due to information security concerns—merchants
could/should not open their systems up to outside actors as it not only contains proprietary
information but personal information of their other customers, which must be protected by
law in most jurisdictions. The alternative scenario is one in which the code is held by a trusted
3rd party.  Therefore,  no  party to  the  contract  has  special  discretion  over  the  contract.  As
mentioned previously, the 3rd party custodian ensures a minimum of disjunction between the
terms  and  the  code;  additionally  transparency over  the  complete  set  of  express  terms  is
ensured.
Pure SCs propose a change in normativity in which the actual code is to be the agreement;
therefore, no possibility for disjunction between the execution and the contract.3
1.3. Novelty
As just described, SCs as a concept are not exactly new, and pure SCs do not involve any
novel technological breakthroughs. Therefore, one could ask: why are SCs making a surge
only now? The reason is that most interesting contracts involve monetary transactions. This
was impossible for several reasons:
(1) actual cash is physical and SCs are obviously limited to the virtual world of the Internet;
and
(2) digital cash, as bank’s cash reserves, is heavily regulated and its use is not allowed in
programmatic fashion by individuals.
This is for obvious information security reasons—as in this case, the information is money—
and its breach can amount to a financial and economic tragedy. Therefore, drafting SCs to
handle regular money, whether cash or digital, is not technically feasible or allowable.
As we will discuss, there already exists some notion of SCs, but they generally did not handle
2There are many online merchants available and some well known ones would be Amazon.com, eBay and the up
and rising Alibaba. Please see http://projects.wsj.com/alibaba/ for more information on Alibaba.
3Assumes no “bugs,” which will is covered infra.
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actual assets; rather they rely on issuance and transfer of credit, i.e. debt, upon which does not
guarantee performance, and is vulnerable to fraudulent activity.
1.4. What Are Cryptocurrencies?
This  is  where  cryptocurrencies  come in.  Bitcoin  is  the  first  cryptocurrency to  gain  wide
traction as a means of exchange and store of value; this is evidenced by its market capital,
which stands at US$5B4 and is potentially poised to gain many multiples if it becomes more
widely  adopted.  Cryptocurrencies  are  important  as  they  allow  unfettered,  programmatic
access to means of exchange.5
1.5. What’s New Then?
Now we can identify the true novelty: the advent of combining self-executing contracts and
cryptocurrencies. Such a combination allows unforeseeable possibilities, in the same way that
the Internet escalated the level of possibilities for commercial applications.
In sum, the novel features of SCs are:
(1) transparency of the agreement and its execution;
(2) independence of the agreement’s execution and the parties;
(3) automation of the agreement’s obligations.
2. Properties of Smart Contracts
SCs are an aggregate of many components, each of which must be properly understood to
grasp their complete legal ramifications. What follows is a distilled description of each with
minimal emphasis on their technical details.
2.1. Parties
The first aspect of SCs that we’ll examine is that of its parties. Each party must:
(1) be identifiable; and
(2) sign—or otherwise indicate acceptance to the agreement and its terms.
This all depends on the concept of identity of the party. In digital commerce, the use of the
Private Key Infrastructure6 (“PKI”) is already well established as means of identification.7 In
simple terms, it is an equivalent to a certificate of identity that can be verified by the sole
holder of a private key—similar to how a PIN verifies a bankcard holder—that must not be
shared. So long as the private key is privately held, its owner can be demonstrably verified
beyond a reasonable doubt.8
The most fundamental concept is that a PKI certificate (also termed public key) and its private
key can be used in independently to encrypt information so that only its corresponding key
can decrypt (unlock) the information into a meaningful form; e.g. a simple message can be
4As  of  November  2014;  source  from Cryto-Currency  Market  Capitalization,  available  at:
http://coinmarketcap.com.
5Available at: www.bitcoin.org/en/faq [accessed 18 November 2014].
6The  PKI  patent is publicly  viewable  at:  www.google.com/patents/US8767965. The  PKI  was  invented  by
Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Tao Zhang and Robert G. White.
7Ibid.  As explained by the technology of the PKI, one of its functions is of identification when required.
8Ibid n 5.
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encrypted by the private key and decrypted by its public key, and vice-versa.
Using a combination of such techniques, the SC can:
(1) be signed,
(2) make the parties verifiable,
(3) be encrypted, and
(4) guarantee the integrity of the code.
This will be detailed further in part 4.
2.2. Capacity
SCs may have their own web presence, either as a webpage or an accessible web service.
Since  they  are  identifiable  PKI-wise,  they  may  also  be  equipped  with  their  own
cryptocurrency wallet, or alternatively have custody of digital assets; e.g. electronic title or
certificate recognized by an authorized system.
As an aside, there has been a movement towards digitization of assets, presumably to enhance
efficiency and minimize paperwork in an attempt to modernize. One notable case is that of the
United  States  that  has  the  Mortgage  Electronics  Registration  System  (“MERS”)9,  where
mortgages and property transfers are executable electronically.
2.3. Interpretation
The terms of the SC are to be written in machine-readable code; to wit, this implies that it be
written in a language that established CPUs, OSes and compilers/interpreters have the ability
to interpret its instructions. Generally, it can be expected that SCs are to be written in standard
programming languages, presumably high-level languages that allow for more abstraction, i.e.
closer to human language; as opposed to assembly instructions which are very close to low-
level machine instructions, or—even-worse—binary code.
Obviously, the language used ought to ultimately be unambiguous, and not dependent on the
specific technology on which it is executed.
2.4. Offline Clauses and Contracts 
Conversely, not all SCs or their clauses need to be neither interpretable nor executable. This
can be useful  in  many ways,  either  as  means of  memorializing  the  purpose,  such as  the
preamble, of the agreement; or it can be used to indicate the governing law in case there is a
dispute. Such examples are: memoranda of understanding, governing law clauses, and so on.
Alternatively, whole contracts may not be meant to be enforced. In such a case, the SC system
can be used as simple storage and can document the signatures and evidence the time at which
the contract was made.
9Information taken from: [www.mersinc.org]. Accessed 18 November 2014.  MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. owns
and operates the MERS System, a national electronic registry system that tracks the changes in servicing rights
and beneficial ownership interests in mortgage loans that are registered on the registry.  The MERS System is a
member-based organization made up of thousands of lenders, servicers, sub-servicers, investors and government
institutions.  MERS serves as the mortgagee in the land records for loans registered on the MERS System, and is
a nominee (or agent) for the owner of the promissory note.  The MERS System is a national electronic database
that tracks changes in mortgage servicing and beneficial ownership interests in residential mortgage loans.
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2.5. Conditionals
Computer  programming  is  fundamentally  a  large  aggregate  of  simple  instructions  and
conditional  statements;  i.e.  if  something  is  true:  then  do  something;  else:  do  something
different.  If  interpreting  the  conditional  statements,  the  SC  will  mostly  require  outside
information. Assuming the SC and its custodian have Internet access, it will be able to query
anything accessible on the Internet.
As an example, one can imagine a friendly wager between friends where they bet on the result
of a hockey match. The SC could be instructed to—upon conclusion of the match—query the
match scores from an authoritative website or web service. Given those results, the SC then
determines who wins the bet and awards the winnings accordingly.
This enables the parties to rely on trusted 3rd party sources of information, without relying on
one of the parties to produce the crucial data—drastically reducing the risk of conflicts-of-
interest.
2.6. Events and State
SCs must keep a record of events in order to interpret and track all obligations, just as a
computer program does. Therefore, as various milestones are reached within a contract, such
events are to be noted; or as certain values are determined and/or calculations to be made,
those may need recording as well for future use.
The full set of such recorded values constitutes the SC’s state. Assuming that each event’s
timestamp is recorded, then in tandem with the code, one ought to be able to reconstruct the
history of the SC at any given point.
Furthermore, SCs’ code may define instructions to be followed when an event occurred—
same as event-driven computer programming. Such events can be triggered:
(1) by an external prompt, or
(2) based on a timer or schedule.
The typical purpose for the former type of events is for when instructions are to be followed,
or data registered, when a party triggers it. Alternatively for the latter case, its purpose would
generally be to indicate some expiration, or that a performance is due.
A simple example that illustrates both cases is one about an online purchase that requires
shipment with a 10-days no-questions-asked return policy. Once the buyer and the seller both
sign, then the buyer would deposit the cryptocurrency payment into the SC. The seller could
manually indicate by triggering an event, which would notify the buyer that the package has
been posted, along with its tracking number—the former type of event discussed the previous
paragraph.  From  this  point,  the  SC—if  properly  drafted—could  conceivably  track  the
shipment online to find out its date of arrival; at which point, it would start the 10 day timer at
whose alarm would expire the return policy—the latter type of event discussed in the previous
paragraph.
This type of functionality is required to track a contract through its various steps.
2.7. Performance
On  the  opposite  end  of  things,  once  the  SC  has  interpreted  the  conditionals  and  has
8
determined the instructions to execute, the SC can then perform any action that is possible on
the Internet; e.g. posting something online, sending an email, making a Bitcoin payment.
This is the ultimate end, without which SCs would scarcely be useful. Alternatively though,
even without any ability to perform the substantial purpose of the contract, it can act as the
manager and/or timekeeper of the contract; e.g. notify the party of the due obligation at a
schedule time.
2.8. Workflow
Contract Law is a well-entrenched set of rules encompassing all aspects of contracting: from
their formation, to their termination. To wit, there is a prescribed series of steps through which
parties have to follow.
One such procedure is that of amendment. The process for an SC is obviously different than
the process for amending paper contracts, yet must still conform to the rules of contracting. As
such, any amendment must not be unilateral, unless it was previously authorized by the other
party. Therefore, the amendment should be recorded as a proposal pending its acceptance by
the other  party.  Until  such time as  an amendment proposal  is  adopted,  the contract  must
persist as was originally signed—in which time many proposals can be submitted in parallel.
When an amendment proposal is finally found agreeable by all parties, it is then ratified into
the contract, its execution to continue in the same state as the initial contract.
A similar such process would apply to early termination of a contract. So long as both parties
can also agree on how to settle the remainder of the obligations—whether to waive them or to
compensate appropriately.
2.9. Reporting
A full featured SC may also be equipped with a web service, meaning that it can behave as a
website does—in fact it may appear as a website, or be displayed on a mobile application. As
such, it has the capability to provide reports, including its:
(1) particulars,
(2) status,
(3) event history,
(4) other custom purpose specific information.
As an example, we can imagine an individual loan agreement. The SC could have its own
webpage, which would give both parties a report on the loan:
(1) its purpose, i.e. preamble;
(2) its parties;
(3) its particulars, e.g. interest rate;
(4) its history, e.g. initial date, past payment dates;
(5) interest vs. principal amounts paid; and
(6) future payment schedule.
3. In Law
3.1. Note on Jurisdiction
This treatise is not intended as a comprehensive analysis for all or any particular jurisdictions.
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Given the authors specialty, this paper will admittedly have a bias towards the application of
English common law.
3.2. Are Smart Contracts Contracts?
The short answer is: yes… generally. The simple fact of using SCs does not redefine what
constitutes a contract. Therefore, a SC could be found to not be contract in Law—just as a
paper with terms and signatures do not necessarily constitute a contract.
As every lawyer knows, a contract is composed of:
(1) offer,
(2) acceptance,
(3) consideration, and
(4) intention.10
Short of any other vitiating factors, the SC would in fact be considered a contract in Law.
Interestingly,  one can quite easily draft  a SC lacking any of those elements.  All previous
examples could very well be proper contracts, but let’s examine SC that would clearly not be
contracts.
Let’s  imagine a  SC that only composes one programmatic event,  which is  that whenever
deposits are made to its wallet, it simply re-deposits them to another wallet. This, in TCP/IP
terms, would be a simple redirect; or in programming terms: a wallet alias—presuming of
course that the wallet it deposits to would be changeable via amendment.
Another imaginable scenario is that of a SC that does very much the same behavior as the
previous SC only it splits the funds in half to two other wallets. This example is interesting as
it  could  simply  represent  a  partnership  entity—in  that  the  SC’s  wallet  is  that  payable
destination for the partnership’s invoices. However, simply by looking at the SC alone, one
could not necessarily determine whether it constitutes an enforceable contract.
Both examples above can be useful SC structures in business; anyone trying to do something
of this sort with actual bank accounts would find it most difficult to convince either the bank,
the accountant, the regulator that what one is intending on doing is proper. Nevertheless, the
SC system left unfettered does not impose judgment—just as your computer does not—nor
does it interpret beyond its concrete instructions.
3.3. Internal Dispute Resolution
One interesting use of SCs is the inclusion of arbitration procedures. Let’s imagine that the
parties agree on a specific person to be the arbitrator, and take it a step further and identify the
person by his PKI certificate. When a notice of dispute is raised, the SC could conceivably be
frozen pending a  decision  by the  arbitrator.  Such a  decision  could  either  resume the  SC
unaffected, or include an award encoded as an amendment to the SC.
Such baked-in resolution procedures may encounter legal issues, please refer to the discussion
in part 9.
10W. E. Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 12th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2007, Chapter 3.
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3.4. External Dispute Resolution
Barring any such internal dispute mechanism that suits the parties in all cases, if a party ever
escalates a dispute to an external authoritative body, such as an arbitration center or a court,
the SC’s records could conceivably be exported and put onto record. This would provide a
convenient, objective view of the facts for the authoritative body’s review and consideration.
3.5. Procedure
Of course, standard rules of procedure are not to be trumped; therefore, such evidence is still
subject to examination—not to mention, it will require the need for a new breed of expert
witnesses and cryptography forensics experts to provide explanations for the data and perhaps
aid  the  authorities  to  verify and  interpret  the  data  appropriately;  e.g.  verifying  identities,
translating the code into human language.
4. Technological Variations
This section explores in technical—non-lawyer friendly level of—detail  of the technology
involved in building this type of system. The following concepts are important to understand
the newfound technological implications to Law from part 5 that may lead to new policy
considerations as discussed in part 6.
4.1. Infrastructure
SCs—as complex as they are—are only one component within the system. Just as a webpage
is nothing without the underlying protocols and interconnected hardware infrastructure; SC’s
equivalent infrastructure is composed of:
(1) a Smart Contract Platform (“SCP”), and
(2) a Smart Contract Management System (“SCMS”).
SCPs are the interpreter and executor components at the top layer, depending on the design
may include the SC storage module as well. More fundamentally, the SCPs involve also an
underlying  protocol  layer  for  the  cryptographic  functionality  that’s  needed  for  verifying
identities and so on. In addition, it includes libraries for SC’s use; e.g. email, cryptocurrency
support libraries.
SCMSs, in contrast, are a superstructure around the SCPs that includes:
(1) a full database of the parties’ particular information;
(2) event scheduling of SCs;
(3) the SCs functional workflows, e.g. drafting, amendment and termination workflows;
(4) finally, a front-end API or UI for user interaction.
At the time of this writing, there are no operational SCMSs; yet there are two competing SCPs
in development: Ethereum11 and Codius12. Both offer varied approaches in their SCPs.
11Ethereum is a platform and a programming language that makes it possible for any developer to build and
publish next-generation distributed applications.  Information available  at:  [www.ethereum.org].  Accessed  18
November  2014.   For  further  information  visit:  https://www.ethereum.org/pdfs/EthereumWhitePaper.pdf,
Ethereum White Paper, V. Buterin, A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform.
12 Information  available  at:  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://codius.org, accessed
18 November 2014. 
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4.2. Cryptography
Firstly, let’s demonstrate how the SC can be signed by adding a “signature” at the end. Such
could simply be an encrypted piece of data at the end of the SC’s code whose meaning can
only be revealed by the signatory; thus, the signatory is verified.
One can verify the signature so long as it is encrypted by one of the person’s PKI keys. For
example, let’s consider that the signatory encrypts his signature with his private key; then
anyone, using his publicly available public key certificate can decrypt and verify the signature
as belonging to the signatory.
Conversely, let’s imagine that the signatory chooses to encrypt the signature with his public
key; then the data may only be decrypted by the corresponding private key. As such, the data
composing  the  signature  is  meaningless  and  does  not  tattle  the  signatory’s  identity;
nonetheless, when the signatory appears he may be verified by producing his private key.
Such  are  the  two  types  of  verification  available  to  the  parties:  uni-  or  bi-directional
identification; whereas one can make himself known openly on the SC, alternatively one can
only make himself known by his own action.
Furthermore, the contract as a whole may be encrypted as to be meaningless to any outsider.
This could guarantee privity of contract for jurisdictions that may not recognize the concept.
However, it must be noted that the interpreter has to be able to decrypt the code to interpret it,
obviously.
Lastly in passing, as an added level of security, by including and encrypting a hash13 of the
code, one can ensure that the code was not tampered with.14 
4.3. Decentralization
Codius mirrors more closely the current legal system, where an SCMS built on top of the
Codius SCP would physically reside in a jurisdiction and would presumably be bound to it,
unless otherwise stated.
Ethereum on the other hand, takes the idea of the Blockchain15—as established by Bitcoin—
and applies it to the realm of SCs. The Ethereum SCP will take custody of the SC, placing it
on  its  blockchain;  hence,  it  resides  everywhere  and/or  nowhere.16 Literally  speaking,  its
custody is within a global consensus network, spread throughout countless computers across
the Internet.
This decentralization of the SC makes for an interesting jurisprudential question: barring any
express governing law clause, which jurisdiction would be said to be the seat of the contract?
This issue is discussed further in part 9.
13The hash patent is publicly viewable at: www.google.com/patents/CA2441117C. The technology was invented
by Silvio Micali.
14In oversimplified non-technical terms, imagine it as a hyper-compressed version of the code, from which the
full code cannot be reconstructed, but the hash can be re-done and compared for authenticity.
15Available at: www.bitcoin.org/en/faq.  Accessed 18 November 2014.
16Ibid.
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5. Technological Implications on Law
Given the technology architecture as discussed above, absent new regulations, additional legal
implications may arise.
5.1. Privacy
Pseudo-anonymity is an interesting concept; it ought not to be as intimidating a term as it
sounds.  A simple way to look at  it,  is  to  examine how email  addresses do not in-and-of
themselves reveal the identity of the person; only if one has the email registered in his own
address  book  would  he  know who  the  person  is.  There  is  no  centralized  registration  of
databases and new, free emails can be created on a whim. The same is true of cryptocurrency
wallets. The major difference is that wallets are not human-readable, to the point where one
could  perhaps  not  recognize  his  own  wallet  address.  Otherwise,  all  is  unchanged,  the
cryptocurrency  wallet  address  is  a  one-way  unique  identifier  that  guarantees  reaching  a
person’s pocketbook, or inbox, but does not reveal the person’s identity.
The issue surrounding this  is  rarely thought of,  but is  as follows: contracts  are  a  heavily
regulated exercise; much more so than the act of communicating—that is,  in jurisdictions
where  speech  is  protected  as  a  natural  right.  As  much  as  speech  may  be  protected,  no
jurisdiction allows full, unfettered right to contract—whether the contract be for: the sale of
regulated goods, a criminal enterprise, or unconscionable pacts.
Jurisdictions will still inevitably attempt to crack down on such conduct. When SCs contain
such illegality, courts will try to identify the party to the contract. This is where the difficulty
will creep in; as wallet addresses will not inherently provide any clues to the party’s identities.
An additional consideration is the encryption of the body of the SC. The authorities may
attach the SC via injunction, but neither its content, nor the parties’ may be interpretable or
identifiable  without  the parties’ encryption keys.  This  presents  a  chicken-and-egg circular
dependency in which there would be viable means to identify the parties,  or interpret the
content of the SC.
Some could leverage the opportunity to hide conduct—or involvement in such—from the
public. This will inevitably come at odds with rights to privacy.
5.2. Jurisdictional
Along the same vein as the previous discussion on parties’ privacy, the issues surrounding
identifying the seat of the contract could be problematic to identify.
The major consideration will be, of course, the parties, the choice of governing law and the
location in which the contract is being administered. There are no new issues here.
What  is  new  however,  is  the  possibility  of  having  a  SC  administered  by  Blockchain
Technology.17 What matters here is that the SC is not physically located, nor administered in
any one specific physical location. In actuality, it is copied worldwide in a consensus network
that guarantees its integrity. In a sense, it is both everywhere and nowhere.
Therefore,  short  of  identifying  the parties—which is  not  guaranteed—, or  identifying the
17Ibid.
13
governing law—which may be encrypted and unreadable—, it may be quite challenging to
identify a seat for the SC.
This could be seen as means for some to opt-out of public forms of legal systems. Given this,
some could take the concept one step further and try to create new underground norms of
contract law.
Such SCs without seat are technically possible with current technology on Ethereum.18
6. Policy Considerations
6.1. Banking, Regulatory and Fiscal Policies
The first effect of cryptocurrencies is the enabling of banking services19 outside of the scope
of banking law.20 This is because there is no need for banks in cryptocurrencies.21
Examining the evolution to the publishing industry that came about from the advent of the
Internet. Here we have a global platform where anyone can be a publisher. It didn’t outright
kill the industry, but it certainly forced it to evolve—as has been observed since.
We should expect  the same evolution to happen in commercial  banking. The storage and
transfer of funds services, given better user-friendly applications, in a cheaper, faster more
convenient format, will challenge the  status quo of commercial banks. The banking system
will either evolve to rival cryptocurrency convenience, or will fall by the wayside.
There are important policy considerations here, for:
(1) banking,
(2) regulatory, and
(3) fiscal policies; as of these would be impacted if a critical mass of the public would stop
using public banking systems.
Firstly, banking law has evolved for centuries and is quite entrenched in our current legal
system. It serves as means for:
(1) consumer protection against unfair practices;
(2) prevention of fraud;
(3) general rules of order; and finally
(4) public aggregate reporting.
Secondly, banking and financial regulation has for its goal of:
(1) consumer protection against unfair practices;
(2) risk controls; and
(3) prevention of fraud.
Thirdly, fiscal policies with which governments see it fit to regulate the economy, typically by
18Information available at: www.ethereum.org, accessed 18 November 2014.
19Banking services are generally referred in law as that of accepting current accounts and paying in and paying
cheques for the bank’s customers.  Foley v  Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28;  Joachimson v  Swiss Bank Corporation
[1921] 3 KB 110.
20Both statutes and common law.
21Available at: www.bitcoin.org/en/faq, accessed 18 November 2014.
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means of: (1) regulating interest rates; and in some cases, bail-ins22 and bail-outs23.
Firstly, banking law and banking regulation require bankers to follow some procedures. In the
cryptocurrency world, there is no need for banks, as previously established. Therefore, such
rules would become obsolete. Furthermore, should there be a massive move towards the use
of cryptocurrencies, to the detriment of traditional banking systems, public authorities would
stand to lose public aggregate banking statistics, which would make fiscal policy not only
difficult,  but  ultimately  ineffective  as  fiscal  policies  would  not  have  any provable  direct
impact on cryptocurrencies.
6.2. Financial Unleashing
The impact that SC can have in addition to the cryptocurrencies’ impact on banking is even
more profound.
Given the previously discussed concepts,  we now see that  a  new, larger  shadow banking
system is easily possible.
This will either be very good for investment banks, or very bad for them. Firstly, this will
provide the financial industry with more tools with which to scale existing, legal financial
products, as well as also facilitate regulatory arbitrage24 to avoid local regulations.
This  will  pose  a  serious  challenge  to  local  regulations,  and  exacerbate  the  economic
competition  between  jurisdictions;  as  the  moneyed  elite  will  more  easily  be  able  to
jurisdiction-shop for friendlier locales.
The other consideration is that SCs can allow for more sophisticated financial products, the
likes  of  which  would  not  otherwise  be  possible,  either  given  technical  or  regulatory
restrictions. Such innovation is likely to produce more cyclical economic fluctuations; the
difference here will be that attempts for additional regulations may be ineffective.
As financial products become more popular, it becomes possible for the products to become
standardized SCs, and hence be easily reproducible by the less moneyed classes.
Ultimately,  either  voluntarily  or  otherwise,  it  is  likely  that  financial  services  will  be
unleashed, either by voluntarily deregulation or by reluctant desperation. At such a point, a
nation’s  ability  to  regulate  fiscal  policies  would  become  very  difficult,  short  of  banning
cryptocurrencies altogether.
22Name commonly given for heavy handed public correction of financial crises; e.g.  Troubled Assets Relief
Program (“TARP”).  As an example, the US Treasury established several programs under TARP to help stabilize
the U.S. financial system, restart economic growth, and prevent avoidable foreclosures.  Information available at:
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx.
23Name commonly given for  mass seizures  of  bank accounts  for  purposes  of  public correction of  financial
creises;  e.g.  the  Cyprus  Bank  Crises  of  2013.  For  more  information,  visit:
http://business.time.com/2013/03/21/cyprus-banking-crisis-the-endgame-begins,  P.  Gumbel,  Cyprus  Banking
Crisis: The Endgame Begins, Business Time, 21 March, 2013.
24Name commonly given  to  a  strategy in  which  a  venture  is  located  or  re-located  in  a  jurisdiction  with  a
friendlier  regulatory environment. A.  Shleifer, R. Vishny,  Robert, The limits  of  arbitrage  (1997) Journal  of
Finance 52.
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7. Criminal Activity
7.1. Potential Uses
Most unlawful activity attributed to Bitcoin is  generally not new to cryptocurrencies;  e.g.
money laundering, theft. The only new aspect is the speed and efficiency with which such
activities could be done. However, one must consider that, using Bitcoin specifically—with
its use of a public, permanent ledger—it is not a good tool for criminal activity as it can tattle
the rogue’s behavior long into the future. This is not so true for all cryptocurrencies however;
such as is the case for Darkcoin25, which is specifically purposed to anonymize the economic
behavior of its users.
Smart Contracts, on the other hand, are similar in that they do not offer new means of criminal
activity—no more than “dumb” paper contracts could. However, in the same vein, one must
ensure that the contract represented in the SC is in accordance to law. This is of course a
larger discussion as such issues that cross all categories of law, across all jurisdictions.
There is one more consideration, however, that is the possibility to make the SC illegible via
encryption… but again, not very dissimilar to encrypting a paper contract.
7.2. Mitigation
Given an SCMS, its interpreter component must at all times be allowed to interpret the SC’s
code in  order  to  interpret  it,  obviously.  Due to  this  technical  limitation,  the  SC must  be
decryptable by the SCMS. As such, a regulatory body could compel, or impose an injunction
on, a SC to be revealed to public authorities.
It is likely that this issue will be discussed in legislative bodies in the future to regulate SCs.
As such,  it  is  likely that  in  some jurisdictions,  SCMSs will  be regulated  to  allow public
authorities to seize SCs.
8. Regulation
8.1. Legislative Position
The current legislative position, at the time of this writing, is quite simple: it has never been
discussed in legislatures. The reason is that, of course, this discussion is pre-emptive, as SCs
are not currently publicly available as a product or service—although, there is beta version
software available to demonstrate the technological concept.
It may be inherently illegal, same as cryptocurrencies are illegal due to inflexible laws on
legal tender; some jurisdictions may have inherent laws similarly prohibiting SCs.
8.2. Lobby
There  is  a  long  held  tradition  of  crypto-anarchists26 that  are  increasingly  active  in  their
lobbying for privacy and online freedom. There is a spectrum at play here. We firstly observe,
on  the  public  legitimate  front,  strong lobbying  efforts  by groups,  such  as  the  Electronic
25Darkcoin is an open sourced, privacy-centric digital currency. It allows  users keep their finances private as
users make transactions, similar to cash.   Information available at:  www.darkcoin.io, accessed 18 November
2014.
26C.f.: the cryptoanarchist manifesto, please see: www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html.
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Freedom Foundation27 that argue invariably in favor of freedom and privacy. On the darker
side, there is Anonymous28, whilst an illegitimate activist group also invariably takes on the
side of freedom and privacy; albeit, in what could arguably be terrorist tactics.
The point here is to underscore the concept that there is likely to be an escalating-arms-race
between the white-hat authorities and the cryptoanarchists. This will  be played out in the
realm of the darknet29, where there are black-market activities; e.g. sales of elicit material, or
illegal drugs. The darknet will presumably make use of SC related technologies and apply
strong  cryptographic  obfuscatory  measures;  conversely,  the  authorities  will  escalate  the
sophistry of their measures to catch such actors.
9. Apparent Issues
There are many issues that can be raised, but upon further analysis reveal themselves to be
non-issues.
9.1. Bugs
A major, valid concern is the possibility for there to be bugs—i.e. unintended behavior—in
the  SC’s  code.  Upon  reflection,  one  could  easily  argue  that  this  is  not  a  new issue,  as
unintended clauses in code is quite common and is generally known as a “loophole.”
This is a more severe concern in SC’s case as there is:
(1) fast performance via automation;
(2) use of non-human-readable code; and
(3) use of large code libraries, which could include vast amounts of implied code.
In such a situation, one hope that the SCMS has a rollback mechanism or that the parties can
rectify the situation; otherwise, the aggrieved party will have to seek remedy in the usual
means.
9.2. Is it a Trust?
A SC is often compared to a trust30, in the sense that the SC is the trustee31 performing for the
parties holding the role of both settlors and beneficiaries; whereas the code is the indenture
27The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital
world. Founded in 1990, Electronic Frontier Foundation champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation
through impact  litigation,  policy analysis,  grassroots  activism,  and  technology development.  The  Electronic
Frontier  Foundation  works to  ensure  that  rights  and  freedoms  are  enhanced  and  protected  as  the  use  of
technology grows.  Information available at: www.eff.org, accessed 18 November 2014.
28Information  provided  by  The  Guardian  on  Anonymous  can  be  found  at:
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/anonymous.
29Name  commonly  attributed  to  Internet  activities  and  forums  conducted  in  ways  that  are  difficult,  if  not
impossible, to trace. Darknet is a group of  individuals founded around 1999 sharing knowledge in password
cracking,  cracking,  cryptography and programming.   Information  can  be  found  at:
http://www.darknet.org.uk/about.
30The basic idea of a trust is that the legal and equitable property in an object is separated and are placed with
different persons.  The person who holds the legal property is put in a fiduciary duty towards those who are
placed with the equitable property.   Scott,  Austin, Importance of  the Trust,  39 University of Colorado Law
Review 177 and H. Hansmann, U. Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, New York University Law Review 1998, May.
31Trustee denotes  the party that  holds the legal  title  or  property but is  put  within the fiduciary duty of the
equitable property holder – the beneficiary. 
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and the holdings of the SC to be its res. For jurisdictions32 where trusts are indeed recognized,
this is generally not applicable for SCs, as a trustee must be a natural or legal person with the
capacity to contract.33 Until such time as SCs are recognized as legal persons, this will not be
the case. A discussion on personhood is detailed below.
Although this is not the case, would a SC ever be considered a trust could bring interesting
implications, such as the applicability of Trust Law.
9.3. Is it an Agent?
What if one could encode a SC to engage in other contracts? Then the issue is whether the SC
can perform as a legal agent34—i.e. to have the capacity to be authorized to contract on behalf
of another (natural person).
Again, as per the trust scenario, the general position in law is that only natural or legal persons
have the capacity.35 Barring such a declaration of status, this is not the case. However, this will
be discussed further in the next section.
9.4. Is it a Person?
As previously alluded, at some point it may be argued that SCs are  legal  persons36, in the
sense that they are:
(1) identifiable,
(2) have a capacity for rights, and
(3) capacity for obligations.
As previously established, a SC can be considered to meet the criteria:
(1) identifiability from its cryptographic identity;
(2) capability to exclusively receiving and controlling—i.e. to exercise all ownership rights
over—digital assets;
(3) capability to independently perform contractual obligations.
There is an additional interesting argument to be made however. Many financial institutions,
as well as private traders, construct software that—via an heuristic method—makes lightning
quick decisions on, and places trades to market exchanges. This could easily be argued that
this is standard practice as it is so widespread; indeed, halting its practice suddenly would
severely impact the financial health of developed economies. Therefore, one could argue on a
policy basis that software ought to be recognized as an agent implying its personhood.37
32Common law jurisdictions recognized the concept of trust, while generally, civil law jurisdictions do not. H.
Hansmann, U. Mattei, op. cit.
33It is understood and generally discussed in many contract textbook that only ‘people’ have the sui juris to enter
into a legally binding contract.  Contract law provides protection to those who do not have or do not have full
legal capacity to enter into a contract by invalidating them.  Some of these categories are: a) minor; b) the
mentally incapable; and c) drunkards. L.A. Kornhauser, W. Bentley MacLeod, Contracts between Legal Persons,
NBER Working Paper No. 16049 Issued in June 2010. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16049.
34 F.  Andrade, P. Novais,  J. Neves,  Will  and Declaration in Acts Performed by Intelligent Software Agents -
Preliminary Issues on the Question [in:]  Proceedings of The 4th Workshop on the Law and Electronic Agents
(LEA 2005), pp. 53-55; see also: G. Sartor, Agents in Cyberlaw; A. Yip (2002), Some Issues on Agent Ownership
and A. Artosi, On the Notion of an Empowered Agent [in:] G. Sartor, G. (ed.), Proceedings of the workshop on
the Law of Electronic Agents (LEA02).
35The idea of capacity is similar to that in contract law.
36The concept of a legal person is that it is not a human being entity, but it is treated as a person for certain 
limited legal purposes, e.g. Smith, Bryant:  Legal Personality. (1928)Yale Law Journal 37 (3): 283–299
37For a fuller discussion and arguments on the application of rights and personhood on non-human subject, see C.
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An  even  simpler  scenario  shows  that  automated  systems  are  already  in  the  business  of
contracting, such as the case of a vending machine. If the argument would to be made that
only persons  can  engage in  contracts,  then  this  would  imply that  the  vending machine’s
contract would not be binding. As a matter of convenience, this has become standard practice,
but this still stands in a lacuna in the law.
As things stand, the granting of personhood status is generally only recognized by official
declaration—which has yet to be conferred in any jurisdiction.
10. Legal Issues
This section discusses the issues raised by SCs for which there is no clear authority and are
arguable either way.
10.1. UPL
The first issue to consider is whether drafting and/or advising on SC constitutes practicing
law.
Most jurisdictions empower their law society with a monopoly over the practice of law in the
state and generally has discretion over the granting of law licenses. As such, if one is deemed
to be practicing law without the said license, then one can be found guilty of Unlicensed
Practice of Law (“UPL”).
To examine this,  we may look back at  whether  drafting  or  advising  on traditional  paper
contracts requires a license. However, there is the additional complication in that SCs run on
SCPs and SCMSs; therefore, an additional issue is whether advising on which SCP/SCMS to
use, or advising on SCP/SCMS specific optimizations, be also considered practicing law.
The final issue relates to who is the custodian of the SC. The SCMS must be maintained by a
person.  Given  the  security  risks  associated  with  the  custodial  responsibility  of  SCs,  an
argument  could  be  made  that  sufficient  insurance  ought  to  be  imposed  by  regulation.
Therefore, it is conceivable that the very act of running and maintaining an SCMS could be a
licensed activity.
10.2. Licensed Business Activities
Some activities are licensed as a business, which are otherwise legal if done in one’s private
capacity.  This  obviously depends on the jurisdiction,  but  for  example,  many jurisdictions
outlaw sports betting businesses, but allow private individual sports betting.
SCs  allow  mass-production  of  one-on-one  contracts  to  the  scale  of  a  business,  where  a
business could position themselves as simple being in the business of selling pre-defined SCs
—e.g. a sports bet contract, to follow the previous analogy. This most probably simply skirt
the  purpose  of  the  legislation,  as  presumably  such  rules  were  enacted  to  prevent  mass-
adoption  of  the  activity  with  minimal  oversight.  SCs,  coupled  with  the  wide  reach  and
convenience of the Internet, threaten to disturb the current balance of some licensed business
activities by lowering the barriers to enter the business.
Wellman, Real Rights, Oxford University Press 1995.
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The issue that arises is whether such a person that is in the business of selling specialized SCs
that represent a legal activity as individuals—but is otherwise a license business activity—is
in violation of said license. This will obviously be a matter of interpretation, but may force
legislatures to either clarify or tighten their definitions of what constitutes acting in the said
licensed business.
More examples of businesses that are usually licensed, but could be mass-produced with the
use  of  SCs  are:  loans,  betting,  lotteries,  stocks/bonds/derivatives  exchanges,  derivatives,
insurance, etc.
10. 3. Regulatory Difficulties
Interestingly, if we imagine a scenario where Peer-to-Peer securities exchanges become easy
to instantiate38, then the amount of oversight required to police such activity, coupled with the
ease with which one could side-step the long arm of the law either by going off-shore, hiding
the identity of the parties, and hiding the seat of the contract. This would inevitably cause
some to re-evaluate whether such licensing standard are worth maintaining.
11. Political Issues
11.1. Risks
In  order  to  appreciate  the  rationale  behind  any legislation,  we  must  first  understand  the
potential risks to the state. Since SCs hold personal information, there is an obvious privacy
risk from having its data being leaked. Beyond this, to have all of one’s SCs to be leaked
would also tattle one’s whole business, which is an even more severe risk as it could be very
valuable to one’s enemies or competitors—more so than the personal data.
Further risks are not to the individuals but to the economy at large. As discussed in part 6,
fiscal policy is means for the state to regulate and normalize the economic environment. This
is done by imposing controls, not only by the Central Bank, but also on the banking and
financial systems—collectively composing the spigot of the economy.
An additional reason for regulating the banking system is to allow oversight on the aggregate
economic indicators and statistics, without which data-based fiscal policy making would be
much  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  Furthermore,  the  ability  to  regulate  banking  is
important  for  enforcing  judgments  and  interlocutory  measures,  such  as  injunctions  on
accounts. A Bitcoin wallet cannot be attached, but a SC could if the SCMS is a licensed entity.
11.2. Licensing
The  first  political  issue  will  certainly  be  whether  to  regulate  SCMSs.  There  are  several
reasons why states may want to regulate them:
(1) legal advice is necessary is the general case in drafting SCs;
(2) requiring legally compliant workflows in managing the life-cycle of a SC;
(3) managing the security risks related to the assets held by the SCs;
(4) requiring access by public authorities.
38Such  as  cryptocurrencies  as  easy  to  create  your  own.  which  is  should  in  Bit  Clone,  available  at:
www.bitclone.net.
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Therefore,  it  is  quite  likely  that  some  jurisdictions  will  choose  to  regulate  SCMSs.  The
options to consider are as follows:
(1) imposing insurance requirements;
(2) imposing reserve requirements;
(3) requiring approved security audits;
(4) requiring a law license; and/or
(5) including a process for public authorities to enforce injunctions.
11.3. Oversight
Another issue is whether an SCMS is an implied trustee,  similar to how a banker,39 who
ordinary40 legal status may change and could be considered in the position of a constructive
trustee. 41   Such concept was put in place with the rational that bankers should somewhat be
responsible to prevent fraudulent activity by their customers through the banking systems.42
I.e. should the SCMS make it its business to prevent illegal activity? One could argue that the
SCMS has a public duty—being the one in the best (if not the only possible) position to do so
—to oversee SCs’ legality.
As such, one could foresee that the polity might see it fit to make an SCMS an exclusive
public service supported by public funds—much like courts are today.
Alternatively,  SCMSs  could  be  compelled  by  the  state  to  open  the  records  for  public
authorities ostensibly to monitor for terrorist activity—much like Internet Service Providers,
banks and telephone systems are often monitored.
12. Conclusion
12.1. Trends
At the time of writing, there is no publicly available production-ready SCMS, or even SCP.
There are some beta versions available with which to tinker. The most long-lived project is
Ethereum43,  which  has  notably  raised  at  most  US$15M44.  Other  notable  projects  in
39The terms  ‘bank’ and  ‘banker’ may be  used  interchangeably by legislations  (as  an  example,  the  Bills  of
Exchange Ordinance (Cap. 19) and the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155) in Hong Kong) and courts,  they are
usually not inconsistent with each other.  Even status’ definition of a ‘bank’ generally refers to the procedure
nature, the protections and common law definition of ‘banker’ will still apply.  Roebuck, Srivastava, Zafrullah &
Tsui, Banking Law in Hong Kong, Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., LexisNexis 2009, p. 26.
40A banker is consider a banker in common law if it shows that:
1. it holds current accounts for customers;
2. its customers can draw cheques from the bank; and
3. it collects cheques on behalf of its customers.
If a banker shows the requirements in common law, the ordinary relationship the bank has with its customer is
one of contract, with an addition requirement to honour it’s customers’ cheques.  As explained in the House of
Lords decision in the case of Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28.
41The concept of constructive trustee was laid down in the case of  Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244.  The
court held that a strangers who acts as an agent of a trustee can, in law be held to be liable as a constructive
trustee, if that agent assisted in the dishonest and fraudulent conduct of the original trustee with knowledge.  
42In the case of Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradcok (No. 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555, the principles was
adopted into a bank and customer situation even the application of the principles were slightly toned down in a
later Court of Appeal case of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 1340.
43Available at: www.ethereum.org www.bitcoin.org/en/faq, accessed 18 November 2014.
44R. Mcmillan, Project to Turn Bitcoin Into an All-Powerful Programming Language Raises $15M,” 9 Oct 2014.
Available at: www.wired.com/2014/09/ethereum-backers-raise-15-million.
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development are: Codius45, CryptoLaw46, BitHalo47 and CounterParty48.
12.2. Looking Ahead
Both Ethereum and Codius have indicated that they expect to be production ready by 2015.
Whether they both deliver on schedule or not, one should expect that this technology ought to
be publicly available before 2016.
12.3. Comment on Existing Regulation
As mentioned above, the authors very much expect legislatures to eventually face the issues
introduced  by  SCs.  The  authors  wish  to  encourage  a  balanced  and  durable  long-term
approach.
In order to do so, one must consider the sufficiency of existing law in addressing what appears
to be new criminal behavior but are simply new manifestations of old crimes. Examples of
this could be of hacking someone’s cryptocurrency wallet. This is not anything more than an
unauthorized access crime, or otherwise put: a trespass, as well as a theft.
For enforcement to be handled appropriately by authorities, there obviously needs to step up
Blockchain technology based forensics and evidentiary procedure.
Furthermore, another consideration for legislatures to consider is the coming ineffectiveness
of law enforcement that is bound to happen from increased technological efficiency that will
lower barriers for the public to engage in licensed activities—similar to how ostensibly illegal
downloads  of  copyrighted  material  became  prevalent  due  it  ease  around  the  turn  of  the
century.49 The lesson to be learned here is that when an activity is so easy to do yet so difficult
to enforce, the trend can lead to the activity becoming so prevalent that enforcement becomes
near impossible, both physically and politically.50
The legislature will  be faced with a choice: either to scale up,  at  significant expense,  the
efforts to prevent the prevalence to reach critical mass; or to scale down regulations. As much
as  the  latter  may seem as  a  resignation—a win  for  the  mob—, it  could  also be  seen  as
recognition of the people’s will to decriminalize such conduct.
Obviously, the legislatures will have to balance their values and principles in reaching their
decisions; but one may hope that they reach a balanced, long-term view lest they ratchet up
public force only to fight a losing battle.
12.4. Comment on Future Regulation
Lastly, the legislatures will also have to discuss whether SCs, SCPs and SCMSs are to be
controlled via licensing.
45 Information  available  at:  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://codius.org,  accessed
18 November 2014.
46Information available at: www.cryptolaw.com, accessed 18 November 2014.
47Information available at: www.bithalo.org,  accessed 18 November 2014.
48Information available at: www.counterparty.co,  access 18 November 2014.
49G.M.,  The  legacy  of  Napster  A  tale  of  two  file-sharers, 13  Sep  2013,  The  Economis.   Available  at:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2013/09/legacy-napster.
50Ibid.
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The first issue to determine is whether advising on SCs constitutes practicing law. If so, then
that activity would be included within the purview of the state law society. Either way, there
will most probably need to be some clarifications and/or amendments made to the applicable
law.
The second issue is to determine whether administrating SCs, i.e. running an SCMS, also
ought to be a licensed activity. This is a new concept with which is difficult to bring a real
world analogy. Therefore, this issue requires a fresh look.
12.5. Suggestions
In conclusion,  the authors’ suggestion to legislatures is to extend the current intent of the
definition  of  what  constitutes  practice  of  law  to  its  congruent  construction  in  order  to
accommodate advising on SCs. When it comes to administrators of SCMSs, it is reasonable
for  there  to  be  some  minimum  level  of  risk  controls,  such  as  insurance;  or  a  reserve
requirement in proportion to the digital assets under control of its SCs.
12.6 Takeaway
The authors  hope that  this  paper  has educated the reader  in  this  new (not  even yet  fully
developed) technology. As much as we would like to take credit for the predictions made
herein that may eventually come true in the future, we must hedge against some not coming
true by reminding the reader of what the future looked like in the mid 90s.
When the Internet was in its infancy, one could scarcely predict the rise of Google, Facebook.
It was a time where only a few were even aware its existence or its technological feasibility;
even amongst those who were, many could not see its utility.
We are in the same period, just like the early 90s on the Internet: where technological issues
are not yet ironed out, where its use is limited to academic exercises and where only pure
enthusiasts endure the clumsiness and user-un-friendliness.
That said, we can only imagine where the future of SCs will take us.
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ANIMAL PROTECTION IN SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Rastislav Munk
Abstract
The author in this article devoted to the protection of animals in the Slovak Republic. The
author in the introduction of article takes measure the legal status of animals in the Slovak
Republic,  and compares this with  the  neighboring  countries of  the  European  Union.
Subsequently, the author discusses the current legislation protecting of animals in the Slovak
Republic and critical of its stance on the lack of animal protection legislation in the Slovak
Republic, and points out  the need to adopt the Act on the protection of animals in Slovak
republic.  Furthermore, dedicated to the protection of exposed animals in circuses, and  also
highlights  the lack of  the legislation in  this  area.  At  the end the author comprehensively
evaluates animal  welfare legislation in  the  Slovak  Republic,  pointing  to  its  fundamental
problems.
Keywords
the legal status of animals in Slovak Republic, Protection of animals, Protection of animals in
circuces
1. Introduction
Motive to write this scientific article was current issue, largely discussed by general public as
well as professional community, regarding legal status and animal protection in the Slovak
Republic.
This scientific article focuses exclusively on animal protection legislation at national level in
the Slovak Republic; comparison of neighbouring EU countries is also taken into account in
this evaluation.
In Slovak Republic, there are two basic legislations with the force of law governing animal
protection:  Act  No.  39/2007  Body of  Laws  Veterinary  care  Act  as  amended  (hereinafter
“Veterinary Care Act”)51 and the Act  No. 300/2005 Body of  Laws Criminal  Code Act  as
amended  (hereinafter  “Criminal  Code  Act”)52 as  well  as  several  other  subordinate
legislations53.
51 Veterinary Care Act is not purely dedicated to legal protection of animals, but it also covers following areas:
a) “Veterinary health requirements include animals, hatching eggs and sperm, animal´s ova and embryos
(hereinafter “germ product”) in terms of animal health and welfare.
b) Veterinary requirements for products of animal origin 1)  including animal by-products  and derived
products 2) (hereinafter “animal by-product”) and selected products of plant origin 2a) in the interest of
animal health protection,
c) Veterinary animal health requirements, hatching eggs, as well as products of animal origin, including
animal by-products 2)in the interest of public health protection,
d) Rights and obligations of individuals and companies within the veterinary field,  as well as specific
veterinary activities and conditions for their implementation,
e) Set-up, functions and powers of bodies exercising State management within the veterinary field,
f) Penalties for breach of the duties appointed by this law. (section 1, clause 1 of the Veterinary Care
Act)”.
52 Criminal Code Act amending criminal liability for animal cruelty – section 378 of the Criminal Code Act and
for animal negligence – section 378a of the Criminal Code Act.
53 For  example Decree  of  the  Ministry of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  Slovak Republic  no.
143/2012 Body of Laws about keeping dangerous animals; Government ruling (of Slovak republic) no. 432/2012
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There  is  a  lack  of  comprehensive  animal  protection  legislation  in  Slovak  Republic.  I
understand,  under  the  comprehensive  legislation,  defining  the  term  the  animal  and  its
exclusive  legal  status,  also  identifying  requirements  and  conditions  for  the  protection  of
animals against  torture,  rights  and obligations  of individuals and companies  in  section of
animal protection, system, functions and powers of bodies exercising State administration in
the  field  of  animal  welfare,  as  well  as  measures  and  sanctions  used  to  ensure  sufficient
protection of animals in Slovak Republic.
I  would  argue  that  Slovak  Republic  has  one  of  the  weakest  legislations  providing  legal
protection of animals.  Let me point out few examples. In Austria, there is a separate animal
protection  legislation-  „Bundesgesetz  über  den  Schutz  der  Tiere  (Tierschutzgesetz  -
TschG)”54.  In  Czech  Republic  there  is  a  separate  animal  protection  legislation  “Act  no.
246/1992  Coll.  Protection  of  animals  against  cruelty”.  In  Poland  the  animal  protection
legislation is represented by: ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie zwierząt, ustawa z
dnia 16 września 2011 r. o zmianie ustawy o ochronie zwierząt oraz ustawy o utrzymaniu
czystości i porządku w gminach.
At the same time we cannot ignore the fact, to which this article is also dedicated, that there is
an  absence  of  any  rules  governing  the  prohibition  and  restriction  of  animals  (wild  or
domesticated) performing in circuses or at least identifying the precise terms and conditions
under which these animals can do so. The Slovak Republic is currently regarded as one of the
most important countries of the EU for circuses involving animals, because there is a lack of
any legal adaptation of the rule managing the animals performing in circuses.
On the other hand, circuses have been totally banned or restricted in countries like France,
Germany, Hungary and others. For example in Austria following legislation represents the
animal ban in circuses – BGBLA No. 489/2004  Regulation of the Minister of Health and
Women on the protection, management and involvement of animals in circuses, variety shows
and similar facilities (Animal Protection Regulation Circus – Tiershutz – Zirkusverordnung
Tschu - ZirkV); BGBl II No. 485/2004 Regulation of the Minister of Health and Women on
the minimum requirements for the keeping of horses and equine, swine, cattle, sheep, goats,
deer,  llamas,  rabbits,  poultry,  ostriches  and  fish  culture  (1st  livestock  Regulation  -
Tierhaltungsverordnung ); BGBl II No. 486/2004 Regulation of the Minister of Health and
Women on the keeping of vertebrates that do not fall under the first Livestock Regulation, on
wildlife with special requirements on the keeping and wildlife species for which keeping is
forbidden  for  reasons  of  animal  welfare  (2nd  Livestock  Regulation  –
Tierhaltungsverordnung).
There  are  also  ongoing  protests,  petitions  and  public  rallies  supporting  ban  on  animals
performing in circuses, but without any response from the authorities.
2. Legal Status of animals in Slovak Republic
Despite numerous legislative efforts and legislative proposals, the legal status of animals in
Slovak Republic is very unfortunate. Legally, the animal in Slovak Republic is considered an
item. This legal status of an animal as an item results from legal theory as well as the Civil
Code. Irrespective of the moral aspect of the animal´s perception as an item, this legal status
Body of  Laws  which  stipulate  requirements  for  the  protection  of  animals  during  slaughter;  Decree  of  the
Ministry  of  Agriculture  of  the  Slovak  Republic  no.  123/2008  on  details  of  the  protection  of  pets  and
requirements for quarantine stations and animal shelters.
54 Protection of Animals Act.
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also causes many legal issues in practical life.
There are many issues with the animal´s legal status as an item, I will, however, attempt to
outline two very significant ones.
The animal is perceived as an item. Under a Slovak law, if a non-owner finds out or sees that
there is a damage to be done to a foreign thing/item (this belonging to a third party), they may
intervene to  avert  the damage if  their  involvement would not cause even more damage.55
Under the current legal status, same relates to animals. For example if I see an animal locked
in a vehicle during a summer heat wave, suffocating and suffering in extreme heat, I should
not intervene by smashing a car window, as by doing so and rescuing this animal I may cause
even greater damage to the vehicle than the one of the item in the car (the animal), which
might be of a low value.
The second, very significant example is, that under the Slovak law is valid that: “the one who
finds the lost item is obliged to return it to the owner. If the owner is unknown, the finder is
obliged to hand this item over to the competent authorities. If the owner does not claim the
lost item within one year since it has been handed over, it falls to the State”. 56 This means that
in case somebody has found lost animal they are obliged to return it to its owner. If the owner
is not known, they are obliged to hand it over to relevant government body. Following this,
authorities should look after the animal for a period of one year, if the owner yet still has not
been identified, than the ownership of this animal falls to the State, who may treat it as its
own. This obviously causes  huge problems in reality as well  as activities of dog shelters
dealing with lost animals on daily basis.
In the view of the above facts, as well as many other problems in Slovak Republic related to
the animal being considered an item I deem it necessary to adopt a new legal definition of an
animal and thus adjust its legal status within the legal system of the Slovak Republic.
It is not a simple act to define a legal concept of an animal, nor it s simple modifying its legal
status, however the fact that neighbouring countries have defined a different legal concept of
an animal as well as its legal status, it is possible to be  inspired by foreign legislation. The
legislation of the Czech Republic seems to be a good option to be inspired by.
Under  the  provisions  of  section  494  of  Act  no.  89/2012  coll.  Civil  Code  as  amended
legislation, quote “Living animal has a special meaning and value as thinking living creature.
Live animal is not an item and regulations governing items do not relate to living animal and
shall only do so to the extent that it does not contradict its nature.”
Further  under  the  provision  of  section  1 of  Act  no.  246/1992 coll.  Protection of  animals
against cruelty as amended legislation, quote “animals, as they are living creatures capable of
feeling  pain  and suffering  from abuse,  deteriorating of  their  health  ant  their  meaningless
killings, caused by man even by negligence.”
Had  the  legal  definition  of  an  animal  in  Slovak  Republic  been  inspired  by  the  Czech
legislation, this would have been a huge stepping stone for the legal status of an animal within
55 Example: We see that somebody´s house is on fire, so we are allowed to smash the window, damage caused is
few Euros, but we can extinguish the fire and prevent massive damage – this action is allowed.
We see that somebody´s chocolate is melting in the direct sun light in the car, we smash the window, damage
caused is 300 Euros, but we will save the chocolate costing 2 Euros – this action is not allowed. 
56 Section 135 clause 1 of Civil Code legislation as amended.
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Slovak law system and this would lead to many other legislative changes both the Civil Code
of the Slovak Republic and also specific legislation. Of course the most appropriate option
appears to be to adopt a new law to protect animals in the Slovak Republic which would
reflect the new legal status of animal; to this I dedicate the rest of the article.
3. Protection of animals
First of all I would like to point out the absurd situation that occurred in the Slovak Republic
regarding microchipping animals – dogs,  cats and ferrets.  National Council  of the Slovak
Republic (hereinafter referred to as “NRSR”) passed an amendment to the Veterinary Care
Act based on which required all dogs, cats and ferrets kept in Slovakia to be microchipped.
This duty has been accepted by the NRSR in 2011 and there has been 2 year transition-period
which required all dogs, cats and ferrets to be microchipped by the 30.09.2013.
As this amendment came into force (two years since the amendment has been valid), there has
been a lot of criticism in Slovak Republic by the public aimed at the duty that all dogs, cats
and ferrets kept in Slovakia are subject to mandatory microchipping. Following this NRSR
responded yet again, by the amendment of Veterinary Care Act which has seen the duty to
microchip abolished as of 1st January 2014. Reform of the Veterinary Care Act was put in
practice by the amendment of  Veterinary Care  Act  approved by the  National  Council  on
22.10.2013.
NRSR originally introduced mandatory microchipping of animals following the rules of the
EU, but only as an error of transferring the EU rules into Slovak legal system, as only the
animals moving with their owners within the EU or arriving from the third countries must be
microchipped.
I consider such action by the NRSR absurd.
Furthermore there is an absence of comprehensive animal protection legislation in Slovak
Republic. I understand, under the comprehensive legislation, defining the term the animal and
its exclusive legal status, also identifying requirements and conditions for the protection of
animals against  torture,  rights  and obligations  of individuals and companies  in  section of
animal protection, system, functions and powers of bodies exercising State administration in
the  field  of  animal  welfare,  as  well  as  measures  and  sanctions  used  to  ensure  sufficient
protection of animals in Slovak Republic.
Adopting  a  completely new separate  legal  rule  with  the  force  of  law that  would  protect
animals seems to be the best solution which is being sought after for many years by various
associations dedicated to the protection of animals. As it is evident from the above, that the
rule protecting animals is part of a legal system in many EU countries it is about time that
Slovak Republic proceed to adopt a law protecting animals as well.
In addition to already mentioned rights and duties, which should be the subject of the animal
protection law, I deem it to be necessary, from the practical point of view that the law would
differentiate wild animal, tamed animal, animal kept in captivity, domesticated animal and last
but not least an animal kept in the zoo.
Furthermore I consider it very urgent to modify the rights and duties in case of the found
animal,  which of course must  be adapted differently than those of the found item. Basic
difference in terms of legal treatment of a found animal and found item is that the found
27
animal should be reported or handed over to the local authorities (city, town, and village). The
second significant change should be the shortened period during which the rightful owner of
the animal can claim the ownership, from one year down to two months, and after this two
month period either the finder or the local authority will acquire ownership of this animal.
Furthermore I consider it absolutely essential to amend the issues related to fetus carried by
the animal as well as the issue of animal inseminating another animal. As to the first issue I
am clearly inclined to the fact that the owner of the animal is also the owner of the fetus
carried by this animal. As to the second issue, this one is quite difficult and it is necessary to
mainly modify the ownership of the newborn animals, in case that the insemination took place
between animals of different owners, as well as it is necessary to adjust the matter of the fee
related to animal insemination.
Last but not least is the issue related to the damage caused by the animal which also needs to
be modified as well as liability for such damage. I would suggest the split in to two groups of
liability; as to general damage and the damage caused by working animal.
Among other things I also see an issue with enforcing the law in Slovak Republic related to
animal protection where I  would propose to increase the power of individual government
bodies,  such  as  the  regional  veterinary  and  food  authorities,  state  veterinary  and  food
authorities as well as law enforcement agencies, in particular the right to enter the property or
motor vehicle when the offense is being committed against the animal. I would also extend
the powers of state agencies in the field of animal protection so they would have the right to
enter the dwelling or the land in order to carry out an inspection, since the current powers,
which I consider insufficient, do not allow this.
4. Protection of animals in circuses 
I  consider  the  absence  of  any  comprehensive  regulation  relating  to  the  prohibition  or
restriction of animals performing in circuses to be one of the biggest issues. 
The Slovak Republic is a home country of many circuses that have been forced to leave the
countries of their origin by their regulations and settled in Slovakia due to the absence of any
regulations of this kind.
Legal ban or restriction on keeping animals in circuses is common in the countries of EU. For
example in  Belgium the  legislation protecting animals  in  circuses  is  contained in  “Royal
Decree to ensure that the welfare of animals used in circuses and travelling exhibitions for the
amusement  of  the  public  (2  September  2005)  as  amended  by RD of  26  April  2007".  In
Norway the  legislation  governing  circuses  is  contained in  „Regulations  on  animal  health
requirements governing the movement of circus animals within the EU (2007)57; Regulations
for  non  -  commercial  transport  of  animals  and  transportation  of  circus  animals  (2012)58.
Legislation on the protection of animals in circuses is contained within many other countries
of the EU, which is part of the legal regulations themselves or part of the animal protection
law, or at least part of a legislative rule.
There are several options how to restrict or ban animals performing in circuses in Slovak
Republic,  either  by adopting a  separate legislative rule  or  amending Veterinary Care Act.
Adopting  a  new  legislative  rule  seems  to  be  the  most  appropriate  option  that  would
57 Http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/ld/td-20070810-0955-0.html#1.
58 Http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/ld/td-20120208-0129-0.html#1.
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comprehensively regulate this  issue or adopting Animal Protection Act,  which would also
include the protection of animals in circuses.
At present, however this solution is not possible due to the lack of interest of state authorities,
therefore the success in this area would be an amendment and change of the Veterinary Care
Act.
Following this fact I propose legislative intent by revision and amendments of Veterinary Care
Act whereby I submit a proposal de lege ferrenda relating to the protection of animals in
Slovak Republic.59
I  propose  the  terms  pet  and  domesticated  animal  to  be  defined  within  the  legislative
amendment as well as subsequent withdrawal of negative definition of wild animal.
Consequently it is necessary to define the concept of animal  performance and of course the
definition of circus is also needed. Only once these concepts have been embedded in the law
we can legally ban wild animals performing in circus as well as keeping the wild animals in
the circus.
The legislative proposal was inspired by the Austrian legislation which has one of the most
elaborate laws in this field.
5. Conclusion
It  was not  the purpose  of  this  article  to  propose solutions  to  all  problems within  animal
protection in Slovak Republic, but comprehensively highlight these issues.
For that purpose several important issues have been selected which we may encounter in this
area, in particular the issue of defining an animal, the issue of legal status of an animal as an
item within the  Slovak legal system and related relevant issues. The issue with mandatory
labelling (registering)  of  animals,  the  liability issue  caused by negligence,  the  issue  with
liability for damage inflicted on animal or caused by an animal, the issue with responsibility
of  the  owner  or  the  keeper  of  the  animal  and the  last  but  not  least  the  issue  related  to
restricting or banning the animals from performing in circuses.
Individual selected issues within the animal protection in Slovak Republic were criticized and
compared to foreign legislations.
59 Section 2 letter d) 2. is renewed by e), as follows: “domesticated animal; animal genera of livestock, swine,
sheep, goats, with the exception of exotic species, As both species of camel, water buffalo, domesticated rabbit,
domesticated dog, domesticated cat, domesticated poultry and domesticated fish,”
Section 2 letter e) is renewed by f), as follows: “pets; animals kept and bred in household as companions or at
hobby-group  of  pet  species  or  domesticated  carnivores,  reptiles,  hares,  parrots,  finches  (Fringillidae)  and
columbidae (columbiformes) and of fish group,”
Section 2 letter f) is renewed by g), as follows:  “wild animals are animals of all species except domesticated
animals and pets,”
Section 2 letter g) is renewed by h), as follows:  “animal performance is any form of showing, exhibiting and
demonstrating of animals, performing with or on animals as well as breeding, training, drill and acquiring of
animals for these purposes,”
Section 2 letter h) is renewed by i), as follows: “circus is permanent or travelling apparatus, where one person or
group of persons perform routine, thereinafter mobile or immovable amusement park, entertainment facilities
and variety shows, menegaries, aquariums, dolphinarium and other entertaining facilities.”
Section 22 clause 3 renewed by letter o) as follows: “using wild animal to perform in circus and keeping wild
animal in the circus”
29
In conclusion I urge the solution of this situation to be addressed to each issue closely and
individually, given the fact that the Slovak Republic is one of the last countries of the EU
lacking legal status of an animal and there is no separate law protecting these nor there is any
legislation governing animal performance in circuses.
Sources
1. Act No. 39/2007 Coll. Veterinary care Act as amended
2. Act No. 300/2005 Coll. Criminal Code Act as amended
3. Act No. 40/1964 Coll. Civil Code Act of Slovak republic as amended
4. Act No. 246/1992 Coll. Protection of animals against cruelty as amended
5. Act No. 89/2012 Coll. Civil Code Act of Czech republic as amended
6. Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic No.
143/2012 Coll. about keeping dangerous animals
7. Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic No. 123/2008 Coll. on details
of the protection of pets and requirements for quarantine stations and animal shelters.
8. Government ruling (of Slovak republic) No. 432/2012 Coll. which stipulate requirements
for the protection of animals during slaughter
Project, grant
This article was written with support from a grant awarded by the Agency for Research and
Development, No. APVV-0448-10 and is part of the research project.
Contact
Rastislav Munk
Mgr., PhD.
University of Commenius, Faculty of Law
rastislav.munk@flaw.uniba.sk
number +421904249033
30
L´INCOMPATIBILITÀ DEL MANDATO DEL SINDACO CON ALCUNE
CARICHE
INCOMPATIBILITY OF AN OFFICE OF COMMUNITY MAYOR WITH
SOME OTHER FUNCTIONS
JUDr. Veronika Munková, PhD.
Abstract
In this paper the author analyzes the problems of incompatibility of an office of community
mayor  with  some  other  functions.  The  function  of  community  or  municipal  mayor  is
admissible  to  hold  and  execute  concurently  with  the  obligations  which  arise  from  the
employment relationship. In this connection the author refers to problems which originate in
practical  application.  Initially  she  refers  to  cases  where  collision  occurs  between  the
performance of the function (office) of the community or municipal mayor and his personal
business activities, or  with cases when they figure as executives in the company with limited
liability or as members of board of directors in or joint stock company. In the conclusion of
the  article  she  analyzes  particular  types  of  legal  sanctions  which  can  be  taken  against
community or municipal mayors, who violate the provisions of the Act. No. 357/2004 Coll.
on protection of public interest in exercise of office of the public officials.
L'estratto
In questo articolo l'autore analizza i problemi dell' incompatibilità della carica di sindaco del
comune con alcune cariche. La carica di sindaco del comune oppure del sindaco della città è
in grado di eseguire lungo riempito gli obblighi derivati dall' occupazione. In questo contesto,
l'autore si riferisce in particolare ai problemi che sorgono nell'applicazione pratica. In primo
luogo, si riferisce ai casi, quando si verifica una collisione tra la carica di sindaco del comune
oppure il sindaco della città con attività commerciali o quando sono gli amministratori di una
società a responsabilità limitata o membri del consiglio  delle società per azioni. Alla fina
descrive particolare tipo delle sanzioni legali che potrebbero essere attribuiti ai  sindaci del
comune  che  violano  la  legge  n.  357/2004  sulla  protezione  dell'interesse  pubblico  nell'
esercizio della carica di pubblici ufficiali.
Keywords
community mayor, municipal mayor, public official, incompatibility of office, salary of the
community mayor, sanctions
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il  sindaco  del  comune,  il  sindaco  della  città,  il  pubblico  ufficiale, l'incompatibilità del
mandato, il salario del sindaco del comune, le sanzioni
1. L'introduzione
Il tema del mio articolo considero attuale  in vista delle elezioni comunali nel 15 novembre
2014. Le elezioni sono condotte  in conformità con la legge n.  346/1990 sulle elezioni ad
organi comunali. Il numero delle circoscrizioni elettorali (comuni e città) è 2926 in base alle
informazioni disponibili sul sito web dell'Istituto statistico della Repubblica slovacca.60
In generale si  può dire  che in  Slovacchia viene  rispettato il funzionamento autonomo dei
60Disponibile su questo sito: http://volbysr.sk/sk/districts.html.
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comuni e delle città e naturalmente, i loro organi. L´autogoverno del comune è attuato da
organi comunali eletti che sono il consiglio comunale e il sindaco del comune.
Anche la Costituzione della Repubblica slovacca come  una legge fondamentale del nostro
stato, prevede che gli organi del comune sono il consiglio comunale e il sindaco del comune.
Tranne la Costituzione della Repubblica slovacca regola il sindaco del comune e del consiglio
comunale la legge n. 369/1990 su Comuni (di seguito il "Codice su comuni"). Nel caso della
capitale  Bratislava  sono gli  organi  il  consiglio  municipale  e  il  sindaco di  Bratislava.61 Il
sindaco  può essere considerato come il sindaco del comune di carattere urbano. (Nel testo
continuerò ad usare il nome sindaco del comune ). Bratislava è divisa in distretti municipali e
gli organi dei distretti municipali sono il consiglio locale e il sindaco del distretto municipale.
Lo stesso vale per la città di Košice.
In conformità con Codice su comuni, il sindaco del comune è l´organo esecutivo supremo del
comune. Il sindaco del comune è dunque l´organo indipendente di competenza originale. Il
sindaco del comune è una funzione pubblica. "Il sindaco non è un dipendente del comune e la
scelta per caratterizzare essa non crea un rapporto di lavoro con il comune."62 Un'eccezione è
la valutazione del sindaco del comune ai fini dell´assicurazione sanitaria e sociale. Ai fini del
pagamento dell' assicurazione  sanitaria  e  sociale è  il  sindaco  del  comune  di lavoro del
dipendente.
Il sindaco del comune può anche effettuare oltre a soddisfare gli obblighi derivati dal rapporto
di lavoro. Questo deriva direttamente dalla legge n.  311/2001 Il Codice del lavoro,  in cui si
afferma: "Il datore di lavoro deve fornire al lavoratore il tempo libero per il tempo necessario
per esercitare le funzioni pubbliche, doveri civici ed altre attività di interesse generale in cui
tale attività non possono essere eseguite al di fuori dell'orario di lavoro."63 Un dipendente che
si lascia a causa dell'esercizio delle cariche pubbliche non ha diritto al rimborso del salario del
datore di lavoro. Il sindaco del comune può essere in occupazione che continua o trarrà off per
quanto  necessario,  o  sarà liberato dal  lavoro.  Dalla  posizione  del  datore  di  lavoro  è
svantaggioso, mantenere lo stesso lavoro per un dipendente che viene liberato per il sindaco
del comune. Il sindaco del comue può terminare l'occupazione in qulasiasi momento.
Anche se il sindaco del comune non ha diritto al salario dal datore di lavoro riceve il salario
per la  carica  del sindaco  del  comune. Ha diritto  al  salario  dalla data  di  composizione è
giuramento prescritto. Il sindaco del comune comprende salario a decorrere dalla data della
composizione del giuramento prescritto. Il salario del sindaco del comune non deve essere
inferiore a quello previsto nel §3 comma 1 della legge n. 253/1994 sullo status giuridico e gli
emolumenti dei  comuni  e dei  sindaci  del  distretto  municipale.  Il  salario  del  sindaco  del
comune "è il prodotto del salario mensile media nell'economia nazionale e la legge specificata
volte da popolazione."64 Per esempio nei comuni fino a 500 abitanti - 1,49 volte e in  più di
61Nella legge n. 377/1990 della capitale della Repubblica slovacca è indicato: 
“(1) Bratislava è una unità territoriale,  autonoma ed amministrativa indipendente della Repubblica slovacca;
riunisce le  persone che  hanno  la  loro residenza  permanente.  Bratislava esegue autonomia  territoriale
appartenente al comune e svolge il ruolo di governo trasferito al diritto comunitario.
(2) Il distretto municipale è  l'unità autonoma ed amministrativa di  Bratislava; riunisce i residenti che hanno la
loro residenza permanente. Il distretto municipale fa autogoverno di Bratislava e  la competenza trasferita per
quanto definito dalla legge e dallo statuto di Bratislava; In questo caso ha la posizione comune.
(3) Un residente di Bratislava dal luogo di rezidenza, mentre è il residente del distretto municipale.”
62M. Vrabko et al., Správne právo hmotné. Všeobecná časť, Bratislava 2012, p. 160.
63Guarda § 136 art. 1 e 2 del Codice del lavoro.
64Disponibile  su  questo  sito:  http://www.employment.gov.sk/sk/praca-zamestnanost/vztah-zamestnanca-
zamestnavatela/voleni-funkcionari/platove-pomery-starostov-obci-primatorov-miest.html.
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100.000 abitanti - 3,58 volte. Nel 2014 il salario mensile nell'economia nazionale è 857 euro,
naturalmente,  senza reddito d'impresa e salari non registrati.65 "Nel caso in cui il salario  del
sindaco del comune è scesa al di sotto valore determinato dalla legge, il valore del salario del
sindaco  per  il  mese di  gennaio  fino  a  marzo dell'anno  solare sarà nuovamente pagato.
Pertanto, il salario del sindaco calcolato sulla base dei dati statistici deve essere discusso e
deciso al livello del consiglio comunale."66
La decisione del consiglio comunale può aumentare il salario del sindaco del comune  fino al
70 %. Anche in questo caso è la questione piuttosto delicata. Perché il suo aumento non può
essere  considerato come  risparmio  dei  soldi  dal  bilancio  del  comune.La  domanda di
valutazione del consiglio comunale è influenzata dai fattori soggettivi,  non ci sono i  criteri
oggettivi fissati dalla legge in base ai quali è possibile l´aumento.
In pratica,  il problema è che gli individui impiegati non vogliono lasciare lungo termine di
questo lavoro senza pagare e fare la carica di sindaco del comune.  Questo è un problema
particolare in piccoli comuni dove non hanno soldi e il sindaco del comune  avrebbero dovuto
svolgere questa carica gratis o ore di lavoro al di fuori.  E inoltre,  "quando il sindaco del
comune fa la sua carica in contemporanea con lo svolgimento dei suoi compiti nel lavoro non
è specificamente protetto contro la terminazione."67
Come ho già scritto, il sindaco del comune è un pubblico ufficiale dell´autogoverno. Quindi è
anche un soggetto agli obblighi generali e le limitazioni previste dalla legge. In particolare, mi
riferisco al  campo  di  applicazione del  Codice  su comuni  e la  legge  n.  357/2004  sulla
protezione dell'interesse pubblico nell' esercizio della carica di pubblici ufficiali. (“legge n.
357/2004 “).
Nel Codice su comuni §13 comma 3 afferma che al fine di evitare conflitti di interessi del
sindaco del comune con il  funzionamento e l'organizzazione dell´autogoverno all'esercizio
delle sue cariche incompatibili:
a) il membro,68
b) il dipendente del comune in cui è stato eletto,
c) l´ organizzazione autorità di bilancio sindaco o organizzazione contributivo stabilito
dal comune in cui è stato eletto,
d) il presidente della regione autonoma,
e) il capo del dipartimento governativo,
f) sotto una legge speciale.
Legge speciale si intende, ad esempio, la legge n. 154/2001 su procuratori e candidati per
procuratori. Tra l´altro, questa legge prevede, l'incompatibilità del mandato del procuratore di
carica in enti locali.69 Il sindaco del comune è anche esempio dell' incompatibilità con una
carica di giudice.
65 Http://statdat.statistics.sk/cognosext/cgibin/cognos.cgi?b_action=cognosViewer&ui.action=run&ui.object=stor
eID%28%22i94C7052B240A492FB3BE8C7A487D337B%22%29&ui.name=Priemern%C3%A1%20mesa%C4
%8Dn%C3%A1%20mzda%20v%20hospod%C3%A1rstve%20SR%20[pr0204qs]&run.outputFormat=&run.pro
mpt=true&cv.header=false&ui.backURL=%2fcognosext%2fcps4%2fportlets%2fcommon%2fclose.html&run.ou
tputLocale=sk.
66Http://www.employment.gov.sk/sk/praca-zamestnanost/vztah-zamestnanca-zamestnavatela/voleni-funkcionar
i/platove-pomery-starostov-obci-primatorov-miest.html.
67M. Thurzová, Pracovné vzťahy v obecnej samospráve a ich právna regulácia, Justičná reveu 2011, vol. 63, no.
3, p. 351-369.
68Per chiarimenti afferma che essa ha in mente i membri del consiglio comunale.
69§ 11 comma 1 della legge n. 154/2001 su procuratori e candidati per procuratori.
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Nel caso  del  corpo  di  polizia,  del  Servizio  degli  informazioni slovacco,  del  Carcere  e
Tribunale guardia, della polizia Ferroviaria, le cariche vengono interrotte. In questo caso, non
è possibile l´esercizio parallelo di due cariche.
Incompatibilità dell´ esercizio delle cariche, tuttavia, è il caso in cui uno stesso sindaco del
comune  può essere membro della  regione autonoma o del  Consiglio  nazionale  anche del
membro del Parlamento europeo. Diversi autori hanno messo in dubbio70 l´esericzio parallelo
di due cariche, per esempio il sindaco del comune e membro del Consiglio nazionale della
Repubblica  slovacca  ("NRSR").  Il  principale  fattore  da  prendere in  considerazione  per
l'analisi che le sessioni del NRSR sono sempre. Non è semplicemente fisicamente né fattibile,
che il sindaco del comune  sia  presente nel comune ed anche nelle sessioni del NRSR. Allo
stesso tempo, faccio notare che il sindaco della città di Bratislava e di Košice è incompatibile
con il sindaco del distretto municipale.
Oltre al Codice su comuni l' incompatibilità dell´esercizio degli ufficiali  pubblici è regolata
nella legge costituzionale n.  357/2004.  Il campo d´ applicazione di questa legge è definito
all'art. 2, che stabilisce che esso si applica ai sindaci dei comuni e ai sindaci dei comuni del
distretto  municipale di  Bratislava e Košice,  nonché  i  presidenti  delle regioni  autonome.
Questa legge rende chiaro che il sindaco del comune è un pubblico ufficiale.
Come è  ulteriormente  specificato all'art.  4 comma1 della  legge  n.  357/200471"tenuto  a
svolgere i loro compiti per promuovere e proteggere l'interesse pubblico. Nell'esercizio delle
loro funzioni di ufficio pubblico non deve privilegiare un interesse personale sopra l'interesse
pubblico.”
L'incompatibilità delle cariche sono esaminate dal punto all'essercizio del sindaco del comune
e non nella sua stessa candidatura e non è l'ostacolo che dovrebbe impedire che il singolo per
questa posizone sarà nominato di nuovo. Inoltre, l'articolo 5 della legge n. 357/2004 afferma:
(1)  L'ufficiale  pubblico  non  può  esercitare le funzioni,  i  lavori e  le attività  che  sono
incompatibili con i doveri d'ufficio pubblico della Costituzione slovacca e con le leggi,
(2)  L'ufficiale  pubblico  non  può  essere  l'  autorità  statutaria o  un  membro dell'autorità
statutaria, i membri della direzione, di controllo o di vigilanza di una persona giuridica, che è
stato istituito per le attività commerciali, ad eccezione dell'autorità assemblea generale e dell'
incontro dei membri. L'ufficiale pubblico ha vietato di attività commerciali72; non si applica al
lavoro, che può fare una persona fisica, come previsto dalla legge,
(3)  Il  divieto  di  cui al  paragrafo 2,  prima frase,  non  si  applica  per l'appartenenza ad un
pubblico ufficiale in persona giuridica,  derivante dalla legge o dell'  esercizio dell'ufficiale
pubblico,
(4) Il divieto di cui al paragrafo 2, prima frase, non si applica alla rappresentazione
a) uno stato nei corpi delle persone giuridiche di proprietà dello Stato,
70Ad esempio J. Tekeli, Nezlučiteľnosť funkcie starostu obce, Právo pre ropo a obce 2014, no. 9, p. 13.
71L'interesse pubblico è definito come segue : “interesse che porta guadagno materiale o altra utilità per tutti i
cittadini e molti cittadini.”
72La definizione delle attività commerciali è la stessa sia nel diritto pubblico e privato. Affari caratterizzato a
termini  in  legge  n.513/1991 Codice  del  Commercio, significa  "attività  sostenuta effettuata  separatamente
imprenditore in nome proprio e sotto la propria responsabilità a scopo di lucro." Legge n. 455/1991 su licenze
commerciali stabilisce " continua attività a gestione indipendente a proprio nome, sotto la propria responsabilità
a scopo di lucro e alle condizioni previste di questa legge.”
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b) il Fondo Nazionale di proprietà della Repubblica slovacca nei corpi delle persone
giuridiche con la partecipazione del Fondo Nazionale di proprietà nazionale della Repubblica
slovacca o
c)  un  comune  o  un  regione  autonoma nei  corpi delle  persone  giuridiche con  la
partecipazione del comune o del regione autonoma.
(5) Il divieto di cui al paragrafo 2, prima frase, non si applica alle attività di paragrafo 4, ivi
previsti entità giuridiche svolgono attività commerciali e quando l'appartenenza di questi non
offre una ricompensa finanziaria,
(6) Le disposizioni della comma 2 non si applicano ai ufficiali pubblici di cui all'art. 2 comma
1 p) e r). Il divieto di cui al paragrafo 2, seconda frase, non si applica ai sindaci dei comuni.
(7) Se un ufficiale pubblico resta in carica, di occupazione o di attività di cui ai paragrafi 1 e
2, al momento della fornitura di funzioni pubbliche ne, entro 30 giorni dalla disposizioni alla
carica pubblica tale ufficio, lavoro o attività o cessare di svolgere un'azione legale legge per la
sua cessazione.73
Alcuni sindaci dei  comuni  considerano legge  costituzionale n.  357/2004 come una
limitazione,  ma  l'intenzione è  principalmente per  prevenire la  formazione  di conflitto
personale con il pubblico di interesse. Il più frequente nella pratica, vediamo i casi in cui si
verifica una collisione tra i doveri del sindaco del comune con le attività commerciali o sono
gli amministratori di una società a responsabilità limitata o membri del consiglio delle società
per  azioni. Rilevo,  tuttavia,  tale  legge n.  357/2004 prevede una deroga nel  caso in cui il
sindaco  del  comune rappresenta il  comune nei  corpi delle  persone  giuridiche,  con  la
partecipazione del comune. Il sindaco del comune potrebbe essere un membro del consiglio
delle autorità di vigilanza, ma solo nelle società in cui ha la propria quota comune. Per lo
svolgimento delle funzioni delle cariche non ricevono alcuna ricompensa finanziaria. Anche
qui  si  può essere  d'accordo con l'opinione  espressa dall'autore  Tekeli  che "al  sindaco del
comune, non si applica un divieto generale di attività commerciali."74 Dobbiamo prendere in
considerazione come  viene l'intraprendimento definito. In questo caso, secondo l'autore "in
termini  dell'  intraprendimento  il  sindaco  del  comune  può  essere  un  membro  (azionista,
membro, socio accomandante) in ogni società o cooperativa che svolgono attività a meno che
è anche un membro della direzione, di controllo o di vigilanza di tale società. Il sindaco del
comune come una persona fisica - imprenditore può fare intraprendimento sulla base di una
licenza commerciale,  un contadino lavoratore autonomo o come una persona che esercita
un'attività che non è considerata come un mestiere (ad esempio un avvocato). Nel caso in cui
il sindaco del comune si decide di continuare, per esempio, rimane un membro del consiglio
di  amministrazione  della  società  per  azioni  di  vigilanza  è  un  fattore  molto  importante
possibile ricorso legale, cioè imporre sanzioni. Da un altro punto di vista si può anche parlare
del rapporto tra incentivi finanziari e le eventuali sanzioni.
Secondo una recente indagine svolta da Transparency International Slovacchia75 (di seguito
TIS), attualmente i 5 % dei sindaci dei comuni, cioè 133 sindaci dei comuni e dei sindaci delle
città viola la legge n. 357/2004. Mentre la causa principale per la violazione della legge, TIS
vede che i sindaci hanno le cariche dell' autorità statutaria nelle compagnie private sono anche
continuando a fare l'intraprendimento.  Anche più triste opera il fatto che i consiglii ritenuto
responsabilità attratto  4 sindaci del  comune o  sindaci  delle  città.76 In un caso particolare,
73Per motivi di chiarezza, vi mostro la versione autentica della legge. L'ho fatto perché l'articolo è stato tradotto
in lingua italiana.
74J. Tekeli, Nezlučiteľnosť funkcie starostu obce, Právo pre ropo a obce 2014, no. 9, p. 15-17.
75Transparency International Slovakia è una organizzazione non governativa, fondata nel 1998.
76Per maggiori  dettagli  si  veda  http://www.transparency.sk/sk/starostovia-vo-velkom-porusuju-zakon-o-
konflikte-zaujmov.
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quando era il sindaco di Bratislava, gli hanno conferito una multa di 27010,32 euro. La multa
può essere inflitta solo nella misura in cui è elencata nell'articolo 9 comma 10 della legge n.
357/ 2004. Nella Repubblica slovacca non è possibile sanzionare sotto forma di un divieto di
ri-candidatura per la carica di sindaco del comune.
Se il sindaco del comune ritiene che la decisione pagare una multa o la perdita del mandato è
illegale, ha l'opportunità di presentare una proposta alla Corte costituzionale. Il proponente
può  quindi iniziare  una  revisione di tale  decisione.  In questo caso,  la  procedura per  la
revisione della decisione in materia di interesse pubblico e di evitare conflitti di interesse e
procede secondo §73a comma1 della  legge  n.  38/1993 sull'organizzazione della  Corte
Costituzionale,  il  procedimento dinanzi ad essa e lo statuto dei suoi giudici.  La procedura
inizia con una proposta di un pubblico ufficiale.
É quindi sotto la giurisdizione della Corte Costituzionale esaminare se il comportamento del
proponente  come  un  pubblico  ufficiale,  era in  contrasto  con  le disposizioni  della legge
sull'organizzazione della Corte Costituzionale. Che significa se la decisione di un organo della
recitazione in materia di interesse pubblico sia accettabile dal punto di vista costituzionale. Il
rapporto giuridico tra i pubblici ufficiali e gli organi comunali ha autorizzato procedimento
causa di interesse pubblico è un pubbliche relazioni e non civile. La Corte Costituzionale può
confermare la decisione del consiglio comunale o annullarlo.
Un  altro  dei  meccanismi  sanzionari,  che  dovrebbe  essere  una  priorità,  ma  ha  un  ruolo
preventivo è chiamato un obbligo di segnalazione dei sindaci dei comuni (notare l'interesse
personale, cariche, lavoro e situazione finanziaria). Ai sensi della legge n. 357/2004 sindaco
del  comune  ha  l'obbligo  annuale,  entro  e  non  oltre  31.3  dare  una  notifica  scritta  di
incompatibilità  dell'esercizio  delle  cariche  pubbliche  con  altre  cariche.  Se  si  tratta  di  un
sindaco del comune appena eletto che ha tale obbligo entro 30 giorni dalla data in cui ha
iniziato. Nella notifica scritta delle cariche di lavoro e della situazione finanziaria, i sindaci
del comune devono indicare se soddisfino le condizioni di incompatibilità dell'esercizio dell´
ufficio  pubblico.  La  notifica  scritta  fa  alla  Commissione  per  la  protezione  dell'interesse
pubblico  del  paese.77 Un  membro  della  Commissione  può  essere  solo  un  membro  del
consiglio del comune.
Nel caso in cui il sindaco del comune dà falsa dichiarazione in tale notifica scritta, appropriata
procedimento di progettazione. Tale procedimento è possibile anche nel caso in cui il sindaco
del comune non dà avviso della sua situazione finanziaria mai.  "Questo procedimento può
essere effettuato dal consiglio comunale di propria iniziativa, se i risultati suggeriscono che il
sindaco  del  comune ha  dichiarato nella  notifica  scritta delle  cariche,  di  lavoro  e  della
situazione finanziari le  informazioni false o incomplete e quindi viola le disposizioni della
legge n. 357/2004, o consiglio comunale può iniziare mediante denuncia che è stata presentata
direttamente  al consiglio  comunale o  è  stata  ricevuta in  forma  scritta.”78
La legge stabilisce termine di 60 giorni per una decisione in materia. Inoltre, la decisione che
ha gli elementi classici della decisione e non è specifica.
Uno degli altri meccanismi di controllo può essere considerato, la disposizione di legge in art.
8 comma 5 della legge n. 375/2004 per cui il pubblico ufficiale deve fare una notifica scritta
77A termini  di  legge  n.  357/2004  i  comuni  e  le  città devono istituire  una Commissione  per  la  protezione
dell'interesse pubblico del paese nell'esercizio dei funzionari del comune e delle sue missioni.
78P. Strapáč,  Nezlučiteľnosť výkonu funkcie starostu obce s výkonom podnikateľskej činnosti, Právo pre ropo a
obce 2013, no.11, p.16.
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entro 30 giorni dopo la scadenza di un anno dalla data di cessazione dalla carica pubblica. La
notifica scritta deve indicare:
a) le persone che sono state impegnate in lavoro o in un rapporto simile,
b) nelle quale persona giuridica è stato un membro della direzione,  di controllo o di
vigilanza,
c) le persone giuridiche dove è diventato un membro, azionista o socio,
d) con i quali parti hanno concluso il contratto,  ad esempio,  un contratto di agenzia,
atto di donazione, un accordo tacito ed etc.
Per illustrare un funzionamento di questo meccanismo di controllo, in pratica, descriverò un
esempio specifico. Il sindaco del comune non ha rispettato il divieto di essere per un anno a
partire dalla fine di una carica membro pubbliche dell'autorità di gestione e il divieto di essere
un socio delle persone giuridiche ai  quali i  due anni precedenti la cessazione della carica
pubblica ha deciso di concedere aiuti o concedere licenze statali o di altri aiuti e benefici,
nonché e nei due anni prima della fine dell'esercizio delle cariche pubbliche eseguite istituisce
l'autorità di tale persone giuridiche. Il consiglio comunale ha iniziato procedimento contro ex
sindaco in materia della protezione di interesse pubblico e di evitare conflitti  di interesse.
Successivamente, il consiglio comunale ha preso la decisione, che riguardava il sindaco del
comune ed gli hanno conferito una multa di 3739,98 euro per la violazione dell'art. 8 comma
della legge n. 357/2004.
Il proponente o ex sindaco ha affermato che al momento di questa decisione non è stato più
ufficiale pubblico.  Nella risoluzione della Corte Costituzionale79 chiaramente affermato che
"gli argomenti del proponente di non essere considerato un pubblico ufficiale nel 2012 non
valgono e quindi la Corte costituzionale non ha trovato rilevante motivi, che dovrebbe tradursi
in forse l'annullamento di tale decisione."80 Secondo me, il sindaco del comune aveva violato
il suo obbligo legale, ma resta il fatto che in realtà non aveva lo status di ufficiale pubblico.
Per questa disposizione di legge piuttosto vedere la risposta del legislatore alla situazione in
cui i sindaci dei comuni violano la legge, al fine di  evitare la punizione soprattutto verso la
fine del loro mandato. Quando si considera de lege ferenda dobbiamo sottolineare che ritengo
tale disposizione di legge inutile.
La conclusione
Per ora si può fare conclusione che 133 sindaci dei comuni, tra cui sono i sindaci delle città
violano la legge. Resta inoltre aperta la domanda perché in violazione della legge n. 357/2004
non può essere ritenuto responsabile, compresa l'applicazione di sanzioni come il divieto di
ricandidatura alla carica di sindaco del comune o della città. In generale, ritengo che ancora
una volta un candidato sindaco non può essere la persona che viola gravemente la legge.
Come evitare questa situazione? Per testi giuridici si consiglia di aggiungere: "Nel caso in cui
il sindaco nel corso del mandato viola art. 5 della legge n. 375/2004 relativa alla protezione
dell'interesse pubblico nell'esercizio dei pubblici ufficiali e il consiglio comunale conferma
tale decisione, il sindaco non può essere un candidato per l'ufficio nel prossimo mandato."
Le fonti
1. Briestenský L., Rokovanie o plate starostu, Právo pre ropo a obce 2014, no. 5, p. 1-2
2.  Briestenský  L.,  Námety  na  zmeny  zákona  o  právnom postavení  a platových  pomeroch
starostov obcí a primátorov miest, Právo pre ropo a obce 2013, no. 5, p. 6-9
79La risoluzione della Corte Costituzionale III.ÚS 43/2013 del 22/1/2013.
80La risoluzione della Corte Costituzionale III.ÚS 43/2013 del 22/1/2013.
37
3. Kopál L.,  Možnosti a obmedzenia podnikania starostov a poslancov, Poradca podnikateľa
2011, no. 5, p. 1-19
4. Machajová J. et al., Všeobecné správne právo – 5. Aktualizované vydanie, Bratislava 2010,
p. 688
5. Sotolář J., Zákon o obecnom zriadení a súvisiace predpisy, Košice 1995, p.305
6. Strapáč P., Nezlučiteľnosť výkonu funkcie starostu obce s výkonom podnikateľskej činnosti,
Právo pre ropo a obce 2013, no. 11, p.16
7. Tekeli J., Nezlučiteľnosť funkcie starostu obce, Právo pre ropo a obce 2014, no. 9, p.15-17
8. Tekeli J., Odmeňovanie starostu obce, Právo pre ropo a obce 2013, no. 12, p. 16-20
9.  Thurzová  M.,  Pracovné vzťahy  v obecnej  samospráve  a ich  právna regulácia,  Justičná
reveu 2011, vol. 63, no. 3, p. 351-369.
10. Vrabko M. et al., Správne právo hmotné. Všeobecná časť, Bratislava 2012, p. 160.
11. La Costituzione della Repubblica slovacca
12. La legge n. 357/2004 sulla protezione dell'interesse pubblico nell' esercizio della carica di
pubblici ufficiali.
13. La legge n. 346/1990 sulle elezioni ad organi comunali
14. La legge n. 377/1990 della capitale della Repubblica slovacca
15. La legge n. 38/1993 sull'organizzazione della Corte Costituzionale
16. La legge n. 253/1994 sullo status giuridico e gli emolumenti dei comuni e dei sindaci del
distretto municipale
17. La legge n. 311/2001 Il codice del lavoro
18. La legge n. 369/1990 su Comuni
19. La legge n. 154/2001 su procuratori e candidati per procuratori
20. La risoluzione della Corte Costituzionale III.ÚS 43/2013 del 22/1/2013
21. La risoluzione della Corte Costituzionale IV. ÚS 57/08-14 del 14/2/2008
22. La sentenza della Corte Costituzionale I. ÚS 475/2010 del 8/12/2010
23. Http://volbysr.sk/sk/districts.html
24.  Http://www.employment.gov.sk/sk/praca-zamestnanost/vztah-zamestnanca-zamestnavatel
a/voleni-funkcionari/platove-pomery-starostov-obci-primatorov-miest.html
25. Http://www.transparency.sk/sk/starostovia-vo-velkom-porusuju-zakon-o-konflikte-zaujmo
v
26. Http://statdat.statistics.sk/cognosext/cgibin/cognos.cgi?b_action=cognosViewer&ui.action
=run&ui.object=storeID%28%22i94C7052B240A492FB3BE8C7A487D337B%22%29&ui.n
ame=Priemern%C3%A1%20mesa%C4%8Dn%C3%A1%20mzda%20v%20hospod%C3%A1
rstve%20SR%20[pr0204qs]&run.outputFormat=&run.prompt=true&cv.header=false&ui.back
URL=%2fcognosext%2fcps4%2fportlets%2fcommon%2fclose.html&run.outputLocale=sk
Progetto
Questo articolo è stato scritto con il supporto di una sovvenzione concessa dall'Agenzia per
sostenere la ricerca e lo sviluppo, no. APVV-0448-10 ed è parte del progetto di ricerca.
Contatto
JUDr. Veronika Munková, PhD.
Faculty of Law of Comenius University in Bratislava
Department of Administrative Law and Environmental Law
Šafárikovo nám č. 6
P.O. BOX 313
810 00 Bratislava 1
veronika.munkova@flaw.uniba.sk
38
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFTER
RECODIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
Iva Šťavíková Řezníčková
Abstract
In this article, the author analyzed the crucial changes connected with the transposition of the
Council Directive 93/13/ECC into the Act No 89/2012, i.e. the Civil Code which has entered
into force on January 1, 2014 as a part of recodification of private law in the Czech Republic.
The author also deals with transposition of the so-called general clause and the annex to the
Directive 93/13.  She also analyses  the scope of application of  the Directive 93/13 in  the
context of consumer loan agreements which often contain unfair contract terms. In the final
part of the article, attention is paid to the legislative technique which was used by the Czech
legislators while transposing the Article 6 of the Directive 93/13 into the new Civil Code.
Keywords
Consumer, protection of consumers, unfair contract terms, consumer loan, new Civil Code.
1. Introduction
The roots of protection of consumers from unfair contract terms in the Union may be found in
1970s when the Commission proposed the Programme for a Consumer Protection (1975). The
Commission then requested also an analysis of legislation concerning unfair contract terms in
the particular Member states. A directive on protection of consumers against unfair contract
terms was, however, not adapted for another thirteen years, i.e. on April 5, 1993.81 In the
Czech  Republic,  the  Directive  93/13  EEC (the  “Directive  93/13”)82 was  adopted  on  the
grounds of the amendment No 367/2000 to the Civil Code No 40/1964. This amendment has
also  established the  concept  of  consumer  and consumer  protection  in  so-called  consumer
contracts in the Czech Republic.  There are also other laws on protection of consumers in
Czech private  law,  e.g.  the Act  No 145/2010 on Consumer Loans,  which has  provided a
foundation  for  extending  credit  to  consumers.  The  area  of  consumer  loans  is  typically
vulnerable to such contractual terms, e.g. contractual penalties, arbitration clauses, choice of a
court far away from the debtors dwelling, provisions on APR, which in light of the Directive
93/13 may be understood as unfair.
2. Protection of Consumers from Unfair Contract Terms before the Recodification of
Private Law
Consumer protection was set forth in the general provisions, i.e. the Part I, chapter V, § 52 -
§65 of the Civil Code No 40/1964 (the „CC“). This solution, however, was not conceptual and
it interfered with the system of CC. Nonetheless, including the repective issue into the CC’s
part IXX on law of obligations seemed to be a clear solution from the legal point of view.83
It was especially the art. 6 para 1 the Directive 93/13 which has stated that unfair terms of
consumer contracts shall not be binding on the consumer. Having transposed this provision
81 B.  Frie,  Die  Richtlinie  93/13/EWG  über  missbräuchliche  Klauseln  in  Verbraucherverträgen  und  Ihre
rechtlichen  Grundlagen zwischen Verbraucherschutz-  und Vertragsrecht. 1997.  188 p.  PhD thesis.  Friedrich
Alexander Universität, Faculty of Law, The thesis supervised by Profesor Dr. Schiemann.
82 The Council Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993.
83 M. Selucká,  Ochrana spotřebitele v soukromém právu [Consumer Protection in Private Law], C.H. Beck,
Praha 2008, p. 18.
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into the §  55CC, the lawgiver stated that the unfair terms of consumer consumer contracts
shall be ‚relatively invalid‘, i.e. it was considered to be a contingent valid deed. Aside from
that,  the  consumer  had  to  exercise  his  right  against  the  supplier  within  the  three  year
limitation period. As a result of improper implementation of the Directive 93/13 by some of
the  Member  states,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  procedure  against  the  Czech
Republic  and several  other  Member states,  e.g.  Hungary,  the Slovak Republic,  Lithuania,
Latvia,  Malta  and Poland.  In  the  Czech Republic,  this  led  to  the  passage  of  the  Act  No
155/2010 amending several laws in order to improve their application.84 This Act established
the concept that unfair contract terms are ‘absolutely invalid’; such ‘absolute invalidity’ has to
be considered by the courts ex officio.85
3.  Protection of  Consumers  from Unfair Contract  Terms after the  Recodification of
Private Law
In this paper, the author will focus only on several selected core changes connected with the
transposition of the Directive 93/13 into the new Civil Code No 89/2012 (the “NCC”), which
entered into force on January 1, 2014. During the process of recodification of private law, it
was being considered whether to include certain provisions on consumer protection into the
new civil code86 or to draft an independent consumer code. Based on a political decision,
consumer protection was included into the NCC; the NCC’s part IV (relative property rights),
volume IV called The provisions on Obligations arising from the Contracts Concluded by the
Consumer (§1812 et seqq). This decision will lead to many amendments of the NCC due to
frequent legislative changes made in the EU law in this area; it was one of the main arguments
against including the consumer issues into the NCC.
3.1. The General Clause (Article 3, para 1)
The general clause has been transposed into the §1813 NCC. The Directive 93/13 provides
protection only against such terms that were not individually negotiated in terms of the art. 3
para 2 of the Directive 93/13. It means that the individually negotiated contractual terms do
not fall within the scope of the Directive 93/13. Nevertheless, this does not prevent a Member
state to employ so-called derogation clause (the art. 8) set forth in the Directive 93/13 and
provided consumers with a higher degree of protection. Interpreting the linguistic meaning of
§1813 NCC, we may come to a conclusion that consumers are granted protection from all
unfair contract terms, regardless of how they were negotiated. Nevertheless, the explanatory
report to NCC stated that consumers shall not be given protection based on these provisions if
the  particular  term  was  negotiated  individually.87 If  the  lawgiver  intended  to  provide
consumers  with  protection  only  against  such  contract  terms  that  were  not  individually
negotiated, he should have expressed it clearly in the particular legal norm so that it would be
clear and obvious to the addresses of the particular legal norms.88
84 The  Act  No  155/2010  changing  several  laws  in  order  to  improve  their  appliacation  and  lessen  the
administrative burden placed on businesses.
85 Unfortunately, there were not any temporary provisions concerning contracts and validity of unfair contract
terms  concluded  prior  to  this  regulation.  See,  e.g.:  I.  Šťavíková  Řezníčková,  Právní  a  praktické  dopady
nesprávné transpozice směrnice o zneužívajících klauzulích.  [Legal and Practical  Consequences of Improper
Transposition of the Directive on Unfair Clauses], Jurisprudence, Wolters Kluwer a.s., 2013, XXII, No. 6, p. 27-
32. ISSN 1802-3843.
86 The main drafter of NCC, professor Karel Eliáš, was against including consumer law into NCC. Further, this
issue was often deliberated on meetings concerning NCC.
87See  p.  449  of  the  explanatory  report  to  NCC  [cited  on  27.10.  2014].  Available  at:
http://www.novyobcanskyzakonik.cz/zakon/_obcansky-zakonik-novy-navrh-dz.pdf.
88 Compare: Decision of the European Court of Justice of October 5, 2001 No C-144/99 the Commission vs the
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Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) is entitled to interpret the general clause
included in the Directive 93/13 if CJEU receives a request for a preliminary ruling from a
national court of a Member State. Based on the article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, CJEU has the power to interpret the general criteria,  i.e. good faith,
proportionality,  excessive  disproportionality  in  rights  and  obligations,  used  by  the  EU
lawgiver for determining the concept of unfair contract terms. On the other hand, CJEU must
not comment on application of the general criteria on a particular contract term which should
be analyzed based on the particular circumstances of the case by a national court; only such a
national court has the information about the question of law and the question of fact.89
3.2. A List of Unfair Contract Terms – the Annex to the Directive 93/13
In the annex to the Directive 93/13, there is an indicative list of contract terms, a so-called
blue list.90 These provisions may be considered as unfair if all the requirements of the general
clause  are  met.  This  list  of  contract  terms  was  selectively  transposed  into  §1814.  The
explanatory report  to NCC does not mention anything about  the issue of selecting of the
particular contract terms.
§1814 NCC may not be interpreted that it sets a so-called black list, i.e. a list of contract terms
that are always unfair. In the court litigations, courts will not have to analyze the contract
terms laid down in §1814 NCC from the point of view of the general clause.91 Nevertheless,
the lawgiver did not explain in the explanatory report whether he intended to provide even
higher protection than what has been introduced in the Directive 93/13.
Beyond the contract terms set forth in the annex to the Directive 93/13, §1814 NCC para 1
bans  a  contract  term  that  “deprives  the  consumer  from his  right  to  determine  to  which
obligation his performance primarily applies.” This line reacts to the Constitutional Court
decision No Pl. US 1/10,92 in which the Constitutional Court openly declared that if it were in
charge of deciding the subject matter of the case at hand concerning a consumer loan, it would
conclude that a contract term depriving the consumer from determining which due obligation
was to be primarily paid by the payment favors only the supplier, which means that such a
term meets all the requirements of the general clause of the Directive 93/13.93
Netherlands.
89 For more on interpretation of the features of the general clause, see, e.g.: B. Vítová, Nepřiměřená ujednání ve
spotřebitelských  smlouvách  po  rekodifikaci  soukromého  práva  [Unfair  Terms  in  Consumer  Contracts  after
Recodification  of  Private  Law], Wolters  Kluwer,  Praha  2014,  ISBN  978-807478-491-0;  A.  Graban,
Spotrebiťelské zmluvy [Consumer Contracts], Bulletin slovenskej advokacie 2005, No. 1, p. 23-27; J. Drgonec,
Spotrebiťelské zmluvy v právnom poriadku Slovenskej republiky [Consumer Contracts in Slovakian Legal Order],
Justičná revue, 2007, No. 3, p. 316; K. Csach,  Štandardné zmluvy  [The Standard Contracts], Vydavatelství a
nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk, Plzeň 2009, p. 188; M. Pavčnik,  Princip přiměřenosti (několik myšlenek k diskuzi)
[The Proportionality Principle – several ideas for discussion], Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi 2009, No. 1, p. 51.
90 Same term was used by professor Dr. Marco B. M. Loos, Amsterdam Institute for Private Law on the Summer
School of the European and International Consumer Law in Bayreuth, 2013.
91 This  opinion  is  also  supported  by professor  Tichý –  presented  on  the  conference  Consumer  Protection,
December 29-30, 2013, Charles University, Faculty of Law, Prague.
92 Decision No Pl. ÚS 1/10 ze dne 09. 02. 2011. For more, see: I. Šťavíková Řezníčková,  Právní a praktické
dopady  nesprávné  transpozice  směrnice  o  zneužívajících  klauzulích [Legal  and  Practical  Consequences  of
Improper Transposition of the Directive on Unfair Clauses], Jurisprudence, Wolters Kluwer a.s. 2013, XXII,
No. 6, p. 27-32. ISSN 1802-3843.
93 The author draws attention to legislative inaccuracy: the law mentions obligations, whereas the Constitutional
court adds the adjective “due”, i.e. due obligation.
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3.3 Price and the ‘Subject Matter of the Contract’
The art. 4 para 2 of the Directive 93/13 is a non-mandatory provision94 which sets the subject-
matter scope of the Directive’s application. This article has been transposed into § 1814 NOZ
as well. The author believes that transposition of the respective provision was made properly
when the lawgiver excluded a term on the subject matter of the contract and on the price from
the  (dis)proportionality  test  if  the  consumer  was  provided  these  data  in  a  clear  and
unambiguous  manner  (the  principle  of  transparency).  Breaching  of  the  principle  of
transparency  during  negotiation  of  the  contract  leads  to  an  application  of  the
(dis)proportionality test  to  both the price and the object of performance negotiated in  the
contract. Nevertheless, even this provision shall comply with EU law, as the Directive does
not mention ‘subject matter’, but rather ‘main subject matter of the contract’; it also does not
refer to only ‘price’, but rather to ‘price and remuneration’.
In connection with this legal construct, it seems to be problematic to use the vague notions of
clarity and intelligibility. As for interpretation, the use of the concept of ‘subject matter of the
contract’ or ‘main subject matter of the contract’ is disputable, which happened for example in
Germany95 and in the Czech Republic in connection with the case concerning bank fees for
loan contracts.96
In connection with extending credit  to  consumers,  the author  also refers to  the important
decision  of  CJEU97 concerning  APR in  a  loan  contract.  As  it  was  mentioned  above,  the
amount, price and reimbursement for the main subject matter of the contract, i.e. APR does
not fall under the scope of the (dis)proportionality test if the provision on APR was provided
to the consumer in a clear and intelligible way,98 which shall be considered by the national
court. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, CJEU had to deal with a situation when APR included
in the loan contract was lower than what it really was. CJEU did not find that such a behavior
of the supplier contradicts the principle of transparency as laid down in the Directive 93/13,
but the court ruled that such a term is an unfair commercial practice according to the Directive
2005/29.99 Such an unfair commercial practice is one of several elements which have to be
taken into account, according to the Article 4 para 1 of the Directive 93/13, while considering
disproportionality of any term.100
94 It  is up to the Member state to decide whether it will limit the subject matter application of the Directive
according to the Article 4, para 2. Nevertheless, if a Member states decides that the provision shall be transposed,
it has to be done in a manner that corresponds with the goals of the Directive. For more, compare the decision of
the European Court of Justice of October 5, 2001 No C-144/99 the Commission vs the Netherlands.
95 Decision of the Federal Court of Law of June 7, 2011 No  . XI ZR 388/10.  In Slovakia “Commission on
analyzing the  terms in consumer contracts”  established at  the  Ministry of  Justice accepted this  decision as
important and relevant.
96 For more see: O. Hruda, Poplatky za vedení úvěrového účtu - mají mít i české banky důvod k obavám? [Fees
for a Loan Account – Should the Czech Banks Start Worrying?], Právní rádce 2012, No. 2, p. 57-62. Finding of
the Constitutional Court of April 10, 2014, No III. ÚS 3725/13. Finding of the financial arbitrator of December
13,  2013  No.  10425/2013,  litigation  No  181/SU/2013.  Available  at:
http://www.finarbitr.cz/galerie/tinymce/rozhodnuti/181_SU_2013_nalez.pdf.
97 Decision of the European Court of Justice No C -  453/10 Pereničová Perenič of March 15, 2012.
98 Compare:  Decision of European Court of Justice of October 5, 2001 No. C - 144/99 Commission vs the
Netherlands.
99 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 2005/29/EC of May 11, 2005.
100 For more, see: I.  Šťavíková Řezníčková, M. Selucká,  Incorrect APRC as an Unfair Commercial Practice
and as an Unfair Term in Consumer Contracts, Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, Rakousko:
Verlag  Österreich,  2014,  Vol.  3/2014,  No.  2,  p.  110-115.  ISSN 2191-3412;  B.  Keirsbilck,  'The  interaction
between consumer protection rules on unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices:  Perenicová and
Perenic', Common Market Law Review 2013, Vol. 50, Issue 1, p. 260 et seqq.
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3.4. Non-applicability of Unfair Contract Terms (the Article 6)
The article 6 of the Directive 93/13 is reflected in v §1813 and §1815 NCC. The provision v
§1813 NCC set forth a rebuttable presumption that all terms which, contrary to the principle
of proportionality, establish an excessive disharmony between the rights and obligations of the
parties to the consumer’s disadvantage. Does §1813 NCC allow a proof to the contrary? Is it
possible that a contract term which shows all the features of disproportionality is not banned?
In the author’s  opinion,  such interpretation would contradict  the  purpose  and goal  of  the
concept of consumer protection as it is understood by EU law; such conclusions would also be
in contradiction to the decisions of CJEU. § 1815 also states that the unfair contract terms
shall not be taken into account unless they are challenged by the consumer. In the NCC’s
terminology, it is understood as an ‘apparent legal act’ under the v §551 et seqq NCC, which
shall  not  be taken into account  and shell  be considered as meaningless.101 In these cases,
consumers do not have the right to claim damages as a result of an apparent legal act.102
It is still a question how a consumer may claim something that has not been a legal act. May a
legally irrelevant act turn into a legal act based on the consumer’s request? It is likely that
these questions will be answered by the courts’ decisions. Nevertheless, the author believes
that  while  drafting  this  provision,  the  lawgiver  used  improper  legislative  technique;  the
lawgiver should have adhere to the existing ‘state of affairs’ set forth by the CC, i.e. the rule
that unfair contract terms were ‘absolutely invalid’.103
4. Conclusion
In this  paper,  the author  tried to  outline the crucial  legislative changes  concerning unfair
contract terms. These changes were brought by recodification of private law in the Czech
Republic. In general, the author dealt with the manner in which the so-called general clause
and  the  annex  to  the  Directive  93/13  were  transposed;  all  this,  within  the  context  of
negotiating consumer loan agreements. In the final part, the author paid dealt with the issue
whether the unfair contract terms are binding or not (the Art. 6 of the Directive 93/13). Aside
from  that,  the  author  researched  the  legislative  technique  used  by  the  lawgiver  while
transposing this Article into the new Civil Code (§1815).
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CROSS-BOARDER MERGERS IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC FROM
THE CORPORATE LAW AND TAX LAW PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract
Cross-border mergers of companies are in the Slovak Republic regulated mainly in the Act no.
513/1991 Coll Commercial Code, as well as specific legislation governing some aspects of
cross-border mergers. In this article we deal with the adjustment of cross-border mergers in
the legal  order of the Slovak Republic  from two perspectives:  corporate  law and tax law
perspective.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
The concept of merger is used as the common name for various cases of voluntary association
of  two  or  more  independent  undertakings  into  one  undertaking.  A prerequisite  for  the
implementation of the adoption itself entrepreneurial decision by the management of all the
undertakings about making that transaction. This is a complex transaction outside the ordinary
course of ongoing management businesses over a longer period. A merger may take the form
of a national merger, affecting businesses with a business within one state or cross-border
merger, which represents the merger of enterprises operating in different countries.
2. Corporate Law perspective of mergers
2.1 General treatment of mergers in the Slovak Republic
General principles of merger of all kinds of companies and cooperatives, collectively referred
to as mergers, find their legal basis in § 69 of the Commercial Code, as amended legislation
(the  Commercial  Code),  as  without  the  possibility  of  cancellation  of  its  liquidation.  The
current Slovak legislation is based on EU law, namely the so-called content. Third Directive.
78/855 / EEC, which deals with mergers of the public limited companies. The Slovak law
under the concept of merging a bunch of two cases of dissolution of the company without
liquidation,  namely:  mergers  companies.  The  merging  companies  is  a  process  by  which
terminates one or more companies, the capital of those companies passes to another existing
company. The company becomes the legal successor of the merging companies. On the other
hand, consolidation is  a process by which the abolition of two or more companies going
through their capital to another, the new company.104 Under the Commercial Code, shall have
the merging and emerging companies the same legal form, except in the case of merger of
public limited company and limited liability company if the acquiring company will  be a
public  limited  company.105 The  decision  about  the  merger  is  in  the  responsibility  of  all
comanions or the relevant authority in the acquired company. The latter is the case of the
104 Par. 69 part 3 of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
105 § 218l ods. 2 of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
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public limited company and limited liability company - the General Assembly. The company
must approve the agreement of merger (the contract transformation) and also take a decision
on dissolution of the company, preferably one belonging resolution authority. That contract
must comply with statutory requirements: the identity of the merging companies, information
and legal form of the successor company, shareholders shares in the acquiring company, the
draft joint venture agreement, the timing of when participants have the right to share in the
profits  of the new company and the determination of the date for accounting purposes.106
Specific  legislation  may  require  additional  requirements  for  some  specific  types  of
companies.107 Such a requirement may be, for example, the prior approval of the National
Bank of Slovakia.  Important factor in the process of mergers of companies in the Slovak
Republic is incorporation. According to § 69a of the Commercial Code, the effects of mergers
occur at the moment of entry in the Commercial Register – the public list of compulsory
disclosure of data maintained by the Commercial court. This registration is made on the basis
of a draft submitted all the merging and emerging companies. This registration has 4 basic
effects  on  the  process  of  merger:  the  transition  asset  value  creation  of  participation  of
shareholders  in  the  coming  society,  extinction  merging  companies  and  the  emergence  of
successor companies. Other consequences of mergers may modify specific rules.108 Despite
that the decision on the merger of the company is fully in the competence of the companies, in
some cases are the mergers controlled by state authority. The Antitrust office exercises control
in cases where there is a concentration caused by merger. Only after the positive decision of
the Antitrust office may be performed constitutive registration in the Commercial Register.109
2.2 Cross-border mergers of companies
Cross-border element in the mergers of companies was taken into the Slovak legislation by
implementing the tenth Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council no. 2005/56 /
EC about cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, namely by the § 69aa of the
Commercial Code. In the Slovak Republic are the cross-border mergers extended to the other
forms of commercial companies and cooperatives. According to § 69aa - cross-border merger
or cross-border merger of companies on the territory of the European Economic Area includes
not  only  the  legal  conditions  necessary  for  the  process  of  joining  and  merging,  but  the
definition of basic concepts such as the Member State or Slovak or foreign person involved.
The actual cross-border mergers are defined as mergers of one or more of Slovak companies
involved with one or more foreign participating companies.110 With reference to the general
rules of corporate mergers § 69aa below summarizes all the elements of the process of cross-
border  merger.  Treaty  on  the  cross-border  merger  must  be  approved  by  the  competent
authority. In addition some cases111, the application for registration of cross-border merger in
the  Commercial  Register  attaches  approved contract  of  merger  and an  officially  certified
translation into the state language.112 The identity of linguistic forms of contract assesses the
commercial  court.  Specific terms of the contract must simultaneously satisfy the statutory
requirements of the legislation of all countries participating companies. The specific nature of
cross-border mergers is expressed in additional requirements for contracts where a bunch of:
106 M. Patakyová, Obchodný zákonník, komentár, C.H.Beck, Bratislava 2013, p. 320.
107 Examples  of  these  companies  are:  management  company,  stock  exchange,  central  depository,  securities
dealer, bank, insurance and reinsurance.
108 For example : par. 14 part 2of the  Act no. 455/1991 Coll. Licensing Act - provides for the possibility to
continue to operate deaths trade companies.
109 Par. 10  of the Act no. 136/2001 Coll. Protection of Competition.
110 § 69aa part 1 ,e) of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
111 Par. 218k of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code – ide o zjednodušené fúzie spoločností, ktoré sú
majetkovo prepojené.
112 Par. 25a part 5 of the Decree of the Ministry of the justice SR no. 25/2004 Coll.
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determining the effects of a merger on employment113, the designing of social contract, the
successor company statutes, to establish procedures for the participation of employees in the
successor company, an indication of the amount of the previous capital, determine the date of
the financial statements participating companies. The process of approval of the contract is
specified by the type of company. The Commercial Code also defines the obligations Slovak
participating companies to disclose certain information. These data are: business name, legal
form,  registered  office  of  the  companies  involved;  name  of  the  register  in  which  the
participating  companies  are  registered  as  well  as  their  assigned  identification  number;
indication of the measures taken to protect creditors and minority shareholders, and the place
where those persons may obtain the necessary information.  The law also imposes Slovak
participating company information obligation, at its headquarters (the web) before approving
a merger agreement disclosed: - information on the transfer of registered office outside the
territory of the Slovak Republic, in the latter case, the language and the legal form of the
company, the accounts of the companies involved for the last three years as well as interim
financial statements drawn up to a date not earlier than the first day of the third month before
the copy of the draft.  The last mandatory data notary is the person issuing the certificate.
Notary certified by notarial act in compliance with all the conditions required by law. Under
the principle of the protection of third party creditors of the companies involved have the right
to secure its receivables outstanding. If protection is not provided directly by the company, the
creditor  can go to  the court.  However,  the  law does  not  provide  protection only to  third
parties,  but  also  directly  to  the  shareholders  of  the  companies  involved  nationals  who
disagreed with the proposal of the contract, in accordance with § 218jb114. Moment of force
cross-border mergers analogy determine the general provisions of the merger companies. This
time  will  be  differentiated  depending  on  where  it  will  be  established  by  the  successor
company.  Where  is  it  located  in  the  Slovak  Republic,  carried  out  the  registration  court
deletion the merging and emerging of  the registration in  the Commercial  Register  of  the
Slovak Republic.  To have a successor company established in  the territory of the Slovak
Republic, will register the foreign register. Slovak Commercial Court shall cancel the merging
Slovak companies based on the decision of the like authority abroad. This deletion Slovak
registry has only a declaratory effect. Details and conditions for entry in the Slovak Republic
is regulated by Act no. 530/2003 Coll. the Commercial Register.115
2.3 Some particularities of mergers of the Public Limited Companies
Specific legislation for mergers in the Slovak Republic is found in the case of public limited
companies. § 218a and next, specifics regulates mergers of public limited companies. Legal
action - a contract which is a merger in this case has a stricter form, a deed on a legal act -
Minutes of the legal act. Mergers of the public limited companies apply two basic principles:
protection of third parties and minority shareholders and the effort to simplify the process of
mergers  in  specific  cases.116 Preventive  protection  directive  lays  down no.  2011/25  /  EU
concerning mergers of public limited company.
In the case of mergers of limited liability companies is significant justification for the merger.
The Board of Directors of the participating companies is under legal obligation to develop
legal  and  economic  analysis  of  the  reasons  for  merger  with  emphasis  on  its  impact  on
shareholders,  creditors  and  employees  of  participating  companies.  Here  it  is  possible  to
simplify  the  procedure  with  the  agreement  of  all  the  shareholders  of  all  the  companies
113 Par. 63 part 1 of the Act no. 311/2001 Coll. Labour Code.
114 Par. 69aa of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
115 Par. 8 part  2 of the Act no. 530/2003 Coll. Commercial Register.
116 M. Patakyová, Obchodný..., op. cit., p. 859.
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involved.  The  actual  merger  decision  belongs  to  the  General  Assembly  each  of  the
participating companies. At this point, however, specified the necessary quorum for decision.
If the participating company has issued several classes of shares, shall constitute a quorum of
shareholders present 2/3 of each class of shares.
Protection of shareholders and employees is demonstrated by information obligations of the
participating  companies.117 The  protection  involves  the  position  of  creditors  too.  Any
outstanding claim must be sufficiently ensured, if the creditor has requested its claim in the 6
month period from registration of the merger in the register.
Legislation  mergers  of  public  limited  companies  contains  many  specifics.  These  mainly
involve  the  specificities  of  these  companies  on  shares  and  shareholders'  rights.  The
Commercial Code governs the rights and privileges of shareholders resulting from inadequate
exchange ratio in cross-border merger, the right to repurchase shares and more. Special rights
conferred by the employees participating in the management of the companies in cross-border
mergers, in particular through the special negotiating body.118 Implementation of European
legislation caused, that we in the Slovak Republic also can talk about the simplified merger
procedure.  This  is  a  case  where  the  parent  company  holds  the  majority  of  shares  of
subsidiaries merger extinguished and property goes to the parent company. At the same time,
however, there shall be to suppress the rights of minority shareholders.119 Legal requirements
for the simplified merger cases governed by the Commercial Code and subsequent par 218k.
3. Tax Law Perspective of mergers
This part of the article will briefly address the tax treatment of corporate combinations. The
Slovak tax and business environment for corporate combinations has changed over the last ten
years. One of the most significant changes that influenced the legislation concerned was the
adoption of the Euro (EUR) as of 1 January 2009 as the Slovak national currency. This has
brought  several  positive  outcomes,  particularly  the  elimination  of  foreign  exchange  rate
differences in transactions between Slovak and other European Union entities. Another factor
that  has  significantly  influenced  the  tax  environment  for  business  combination  was  the
reduction in  worldwide activity in  2009 due to  the global financial  crisis  resulting in  the
decline of foreign investment in Slovakia. Last but not least the amendment to the Act no.
595/2003  Coll.  Income  Tax  Act  („ITA“)  introduced  two  tax  regimes  for  business
combinations as of 1 January 2010. Moreover, with effect as of 1 January 2015 there are
several important changes taking place due to the adoption of the latest ITA amendment such
as re-introduction of thin capitalization rules or changes in tax depreciation. 
3.1 Different tax treatment of asset purchase and share purchase 
At the beginning, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is a significant difference between
the tax treatment of asset deals and share deals.
As to the former, assets can be purchased as either individual assets or as a business/ part of a
business. In principle, in a pure asset deal, the buyer  does not assume the liabilities of the
company from which the assets are acquired. On the sale of a business or part of a business,
the seller is generally obliged to transfer to the buyer all assets, rights and other property that
relate  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  business,  and the  buyer  is  required  to  assume all
117 Look at par. 218 part 2 and next of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
118 Look at par. 218lb and next of  the Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code.
119 M. Patakyová, Obchodný..., p. 922.
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obligations related to the proper functioning of the business and to pay the purchase price as
mutually agreed. Thus, the business or a part of a business is transferred as a going concern
except of several public law obligations (such as tax payable) that are not subject to transfer.
On the other hand, the transfer of the business from the seller  to the buyer also includes
obligations from employment relations and industrial property rights. The Slovak Commercial
Code  applies the same principles to a sale of part of a business as to the sale of a whole
business, but such a part of a business must be categorized as an independent operational unit
before the sale. Consequently, the part of the business should maintain its own books from the
accounting perspective and have records of assets and liabilities relating to that part of the
business. The purchase price of assets generally is considered as the acquisition value for tax
depreciation  purposes.  Generally,  the  acquired  assets  may  be  further  depreciated  for  tax
purposes (up to the acquisition price), except for certain items stipulated by the Slovak tax
law (e.g. land property). Moreover, the seller should be aware of the fact that a tax loss on
certain assets sold is not considered as a tax-deductible item (e.g. loss on the sale of land).
When acquiring a business or part of a business, it is essential for the sale-purchase agreement
to stipulate the acquisition price for each individual asset as this helps to avoid problems in
determining the acquisition price for the respective assets acquired with the business later.
In respect of asset deal we further need to address the consequences that it brings to goodwill
according to  Slovak tax  legislation.  Goodwill,  positive  or  negative,  does  not  arise  in  the
purchase of individual assets but may arise in the purchase of a business or part of a business.
As of 1 January 2010, the assets acquired on the sale or purchase of a business or part of a
business should be valued for tax purposes at their fair market values according to accounting
regulations. According to par. 17a (5) ITA, depreciation of goodwill or release of negative
goodwill  should  be  included  in  the  tax  base,  as  a  cost  or  income  respectively,  over  a
maximum of seven tax periods starting with the period in which the goodwill arose (i.e. in the
year of the purchase of business) at  1/7 of the value each year.  This treatment is  usually
subject to specific conditions, such as an economic continuity test.
With regards to the later - sale of shares, under the Slovak income tax legislation, capital gains
on a sale of shares in a Slovak company are considered to be subject to Slovak corporate or
personal income tax. For individuals, an income tax rate of 19% applies to their tax base not
exceeding EUR 35,022.31 for 2014 (monthly in the amount of EUR 2,918.52); a rate of 25%
applies to the portion of the tax base in excess of EUR 35,022.31. For companies, a corporate
income tax rate of 22% applies as of 1 January 2014120 . To briefly outline to tax treatment of
sale of shares we should highlight the fact that in case a Slovak company sells shares, it is
always liable to pay tax in Slovakia on the transaction. As of 1 January 2014 an amendment to
ITA introduced that  income from the sale of shares in a  Slovak company generated by a
Slovak tax non-resident is treated as Slovakia source income121 under Slovak rules unless the
seller is an EU tax resident122. However, where the buyer of the shares is a Slovak tax resident
or Slovak permanent establishment of a non-resident123,  income from the sale of shares is
taxable in Slovakia even in the case of EU residents. The exemption from tax on capital gains
may be only based on provisions of respective double tax treaty concluded between Slovakia
and the respective country.
In a share acquisition, the purchaser takes over the target company together with all related
liabilities,  including  contingent  liabilities.  In  this  case,  the  purchaser  may  require  more
120 Par. 15 of the Act no. 595/2003 Coll. Income Tax Act.
121 Par. 16 (g) of the Act no. 595/2003 Coll. Income Tax Act.
122 Par. 2 (t) of the Act no. 595/2003 Coll. Income Tax Act.
123 Par. 16 (a) of the Act no. 595/2003 Coll. Income Tax Act.
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extensive indemnities and warranties than in the case of an asset acquisition.  From a tax
perspective,  it  is  advisable  due  to  statutory limitation  included in  par.  69  of  the  Act  no.
563/2009  Coll.  Tax  Administration  Act  (“TAA”),  to  seek  tax  warranties  and  indemnities
covering a period of at least 6 years after the end of the year in which the share-purchase
agreement was concluded and at least 8 years if the target company carried forward a tax loss.
3.2 Tax losses carry-forward
As of 1 January 2014, tax losses in Slovakia can be carried forward in equal parts (1/4) over 4
years. Transitional provisions to ITA provide that any tax losses reported from 2010 to 2013
and not utilized before 1 January 2014 can only be carried forward in four equal portions
based on the new rules. There are no restrictions in the tax loss carry forward rules relating to
a  change  of  shareholders  of  a  company  or  a  change  of  its  business.  Generally,  a  legal
successor may carry forward tax losses declared by a company that was dissolved without
liquidation, provided that the purpose of the restructuring was not solely to avoid tax.
4. Conclusion
Cross-border mergers as a form of dissolution of the company without liquidation with cross-
border elements are carried out for a number of motives. The most common is efficiency,
which  can  then  be  increased  through  effective  management,  operational  and  financial
synergies and market power of the company. Precisely because of the legal and organizational
connection between the parties increases the market power of the new entity, which is one of
the reasons why such statements are subject to a concentration within the meaning of anti-
trust legislation. Among other themes, we can mention undervaluation of the target company:
this theme is based on the existence of inefficient capital markets, which failed to correctly
assess the target company. If the shares are undervalued the company, then in the case of
expansion seems to be preferable asset acquisition or merger with the target company instead
of alternative investments in the same device. Another motive is the liquidation value, where
the reason for the merger of a company may also be that the liquidation value of the assets
may be greater than the value of the company. This motif is similar to the content of the motif
related to underestimation of the target company, but this is an understatement of assets that
we sell. Of course the border mergers occur also in other specific motifs of the managers.
Sources
1. Babčák V., Daňové právo Slovenskej republiky, Epos, Bratislava 2012, s. 671. ISBN: 978-
80-8057-971-5
2. Patakyová M., Obchodný zákonník, komentár, C.H.Beck, Bratislava 2013, s. 1677. ISBN:
978-80-89603-12-1
3. Act no. 595/2003 Coll. Income Tax Act
4. Act no. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code
5. Act no. 530/2003 Coll. Commercial Register
6. Act no. 311/2001 Coll. Labour Code
7. Act no. 136/2001 Coll. Protection of Competition
8. Act no. 455/1991 Coll. Licensing Act
9. Act no. 563/2009 Coll. Tax Administration Act
10. Decree of the Ministry of the justice SR no. 25/2004 Coll.
Project, grant
This paper was supported by the Grant UK no. UK/521/2014.
50
Contact
Mgr. Jana Šmelková
Mgr. Kristína Jurkovičová
Comenius University in Bratislava
Faculty of Law
Šafárikovo nám. 6
P.O.BOX 313
810 00, Bratislava
jana.smelkova@flaw.uniba.sk
51
CONFLICT OF LAWS CROSS TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWS:
THE CONFLICTING MODELS IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION
OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Ivan K. Mugabi
Cardiff University
Several scholars of legal jurisprudence contend human rights law (HRL) and international
humanitarian law (IHL) share same school origin.  In fact postmodern scholars of the law
school such as Hugo Grotius are classical example of proponents subscribing to the above
view.  Therefore  the  two  branches  of  public  international  law  are  both  founded  on  the
protection  of  humane,  humanity  and  humanitarian  principles  thus  accounting  for  the
similarities in their major attributes. Contrarily the discussion unveils some research findings
exposing the wide differences in conceptualisation the rights of persons with disabilities under
IHL and HRL in times of armed conflicts and times of peace respectively. In this case IHL/
LOAC and HRL possess two varied models that are completely irreconcilable on to each
other. In this IHL is one branch of public international law according to which the rights of
persons with disabilities are framed upon a medical model instead of the social rights based
model provided for and promoted under the CRPD for HRL. The paper shall advance this
argument by demonstrating the potential of a legal battle between these two sister branches of
public international law. This raises the question of sufficiency, coherence in objectivity and
adequacy of the two branches of law in reaching the same aims and goals as far as the best
interests  of  disabled  people  are  concerned.  Such  as  autonomy,  equal  recognition  and
independent living and adequate protection in the post armed conflict period. This generated a
reported made the contradictory models embedded in the theoretical frameworks from the two
evident  and  visible.  It  is  upon  this  that  observations  and  conclusions  on  the  different
characteristics from the two categories of pubic laws reached.
Keywords
Conflict of laws, public international law, disability
1. Introduction
The issues concerning the rights of persons with disabilities have undergone a number of
drastic reforms in the last few decades. In most cases this implies that the developments are a
reflection of social changes which have had a draconian impact and indeed a profound legacy
on the international progression on the rights of persons with disabilities. The research paper
is intended to accord redress to a wide range of irreconcilable developments around to two
related branches if public international law. These include; human rights law on one hand and
international humanitarian law on the other.  The two fields of public international law are
part of the remarkably outstanding branches that deal with a wide range of areas. These areas
range from aspects of human rights,  environmental law to those of the different types of
armed conflicts. In this case the attention is centred on how core aspects of disability have
been perceived in  the  last  few years  under  the  lenses  of  the  contemporary human rights
regime in relation to how these are conceptualised under international humanitarian law.
The historical context that underlies the circumstances in which the two branches of law have
been conserved to be of vital importance in understanding the major variations of interfaces
by the above two areas of public international law with aspects of disability rights.  This study
is advanced further to conceptualise the eventual responses to issues of disabled people by
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each of the two branches of public international law respectively. For instance it is in as much
as human rights started their development with the UDHR in 1944-1948 the first soft law the
laws  of  armed  conflict  predated  the  Lieber  code  of  1800.  It  is  apparent  that  laws  have
gradually changed with change in society. It must be appreciated that the earliest laws were
regarded to be on remarkable impact on societies al  large but at  the same time these had
profoundly weaknesses.
In this case rights of the minority grounds were indeed invisible and in many respects the
same rights could be completely non-existent at the different points in time.  In the above vain
the paper uses the historical context to mirror that legal perception of person with disabilities.
In  the  same  ethos  that  papers  advances  this  argument  further  to  relate  these  historical
influences  with  respect  to  their  impact  on  the  current  state  of  developments  in  public
international  law.  This approach is  aimed to demonstrating the sociological  and historical
influences of other disciplines to the present day structure of and conceptualisation of public
international law.
Conversely the discussion appreciates how persons with disability continue to suffer due to
practices that states, societies and states have adopted from outmoded practices of the past
legal regimes. International humanitarian laws have currently impacted the manner in which
disabled veterans are likely to treat. Certainly the Geneva Convention as well as the additional
Protocols are such remarkably respectable international instruments in situations of armed
conflicts. In spite of the above challenge these are still tainted with a few weaknesses more so
as far as the inclusions and comprehension of disabled persons is concerned.
By and large the terminologies such as disability, disabled and disabilities are all used in the
texts of the major sources of human rights and humanitarian laws. Unfortunately the nature of
language used in these domains of public international clearly differs. This could be attributed
to the fact that legal developments are also known to have undergone consistent changes over
a period of time. In this respect it must be appreciated from the findings that these distinctive
zones are known to clash and in some aspects so as the result into conflict of law situations. It
must  be  understood  that  the  conflict  of  law  arises  from the  rather  contradictory  than  a
complementary perception of persons with disabilities. This could be a direct consequence of
the  historical  context  and  the  varied  motives  for  which  these  specialities  of  public
international law were intended.
Therefore it is highly debatable as to whether the above two branches of post modernism
natural scholars could portray any evidence of complementarity as far as how their conceptual
and contextual frameworks are  structured with respect to persons with disabilities.   Their
interactions  with  aspects  of  disability  is  indeed  an  interesting  and  yet  a  very  unclear,
undirected and largely an ambiguous trend of unmonitored development. On the contrary it
might seem more apparent from the current state of findings for this research that the nature
of relationship with disability by the two branches of public international law seems more
contradictory and less complementary. Conversely this is one area of law that deserves careful
academic  scrutiny  to  comprehend  the  similarities  and  rationalise  the  differences  in  the
objectives  of  human  rights  and  international  humanitarian  law.  Interestingly  the
correspondence interactions with issues of persons with disabilities seem clearly weak and in
some respects totally disjointed. The interfaces of these interactions could be traced for the
theoretical landscape underpinning the objective and core values of these two different areas
on public international law. As such the rights person with disabilities the impact of the varied
conceptual  interactions  indeed  the  two  areas  of  law  conceive  and  theorise  persons  with
disabilities stands out as remarkable feature worthwhile according further exploration. Equal
important yet another question can be raised to whether these irreconcilable differences enable
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to the two areas of public international law have the same capability and efficiency in far as
meeting the interests of persons with disabilities is corned.
As far as  schools of legal jurisprudence are concerned the two branhes namely human rigths
and international humanitriain law are still perceived are inlinked and indeed interconnected
following their origin being more traceable to the same patronage of  post modern natural
scholars of legal jurisprudence. In pratice this study shall challenge to unchanged presumption
of  complementarity and consistence  in human rights and international humanitrian law as far
as  the  protectiveness  and  inclusiveness  of  persons  with  disablities  is  concerned.  This
hypothetical scenario remains highly underresearched  and indeed contitutes a subject matter
for even more research. wherever this hypothetical model shall be used, it can be developed
futher to strengthen the theoratical diamensions upon which the problems faced by disabled
people can be contexalised and subsequently addressed Therefore the theoratical  concepts
underlying the two branhces of are inspirational and insighful. Subsequeltly the study needs to
explore the jurisprudential concepts that underpin the laws as attributes of vital  importance.
In essence it becomes apparent that the nature of factors constraining disability rights remains
a growing concern and yet there are number of multifaceted impediments that play a directly
or indirectly role in hindering the smooth enjoyment of disability rights. In essence more
attention  detail  and  research  is  equally  relevant  if  the  communities  are  to  remain
predominantly undertake reforms mention for vulnerable groups pf person to be in position to
benefit for the nature of protection accorded under the right based approach. This could in
terms of its severity have several impacts of the less protected and vulnerable groups. The
study finds it relevant to explain the means and method that were used by the study to reach
some of the constructive observations upon which this study has drawn observations but also
developed strands of theoretical connections. In this case the method use would in most cases
come up with the same results if another person used it in with the same materials carrying
out the research related developments. Certainly like any other methods research even through
the  use  of  the  following  method  there  could  be  allowance  for  error  but  in  this  case  the
likelihood of such an occurrence is more than unlikely.
2. Methodological framework
Mixed methods were used in carrying out this analysis. These methods included the collection
the primary data. The primary data that was used most included the official reports that were
obtained from the  websites.  The major  websites  included that  of  the United  Nations  that
consists of the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) at the same time for the international
humanitarian  law  the  laws  that  were  used  were  all  secured  from  the  website  of  the
Internationals  Red Cross.  This was intended to ensure some degree of consistence in the
quality and structural formats of the primary data that was to generate the results of secondary
findings. On this occasion the reports were easily obtained with the general motive of ensure.
In reality the resources that were from authentic websites. This was aimed at ensure that sites
are report relied upon were taken from highly reliable sources. A total of 27 shown documents
were extracted below. The documents were all up loaded through the Nvivo software tool.
Anticic was also used in some of the analysis of textual reports. The results are attached as
appendixes. The word query frequency was carried out on both the document oh human right
and those of international humanitarian law. The methodology was based on the view that
unless the legal frameworks are consistent in directing and instructing states on how they are
expected to deals with disabled, it is very unlikely  that intended results of restoring humanity,
dignity and bodily integrity shall be attained   result are likely to be attained in the shorty or in
the long run. The analysis was carried out three separate phases. Phase one consisted of only
human rights Conventions and treaties, while Phase two comprised of only instruments of
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international  humanitarian  law  while  the  third  phase  comprised  of  a  combination  both
international humanitarian law and human rights law. The trio test approach was very useful is
comprehending how and why these law use the term protect. It was apparent that the use and
conception of the duty to protect at some stage referred to disabilities in both braches of law
(that is human rights CRPD on disability and the treaties if international humanitarian law
from completely different contexts for the sake of meeting clearly varied agendas on several
occasions s respectively.  Equally interesting is how the legal language on disability rights
keeps consistently changing over years. The legitimacy of disability rights has increasingly
become the centre of attention for the regime the recently developing models of human rights
in the latest human rights regimes.  This is more varied from how disability was protected and
perceived in the 1863 under the Lieber code in relation to the present day perspective under
the 2006 CRPD.  In fact some the positions are totally irreconcilable is relation to the ways in
which IHL and human rights understand to concept of disability and subsequently the rights
of person with disabilities. After the different documents were uploaded through software, it
aided the theorising and processing and later the connectivity of word patterns. According to
the IHL documents the wording was more centred on civilians. As such a process was all able
to notice as expected the when the word query analysis were carried, it was able to generate
the report of words in their ascending order. This generated report attached the appendix of
the study. As expected from the findings for three completely separate reports that were rather
activities and completely.
The documents that were considered during the study process:
(1) Lieber code Government of Armies of the United States in the Field of 1863,
(2) Declaration (IV-2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases (The Hague, 29 July 1899),
(3) Declaration (IV, 3) concerning Expanding Bullets of 1899,
(4) Hague Convention IV – Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907,
(5) Hague Convention on Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines of 1907,
(6) Hague Convention Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War of 1907,
(7) Hague Convention the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval of 1907,
(8) Right of Capture in Naval War (The Hague, 18 October 1907),
(9) Hague Rules on Air Warfare of 1923,
(10) Protocol  for  the Prohibition of  the Use in  War of  Asphyxiating,  Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925,
(11) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948,
(12) Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field – First Geneva Convention, hereinafter: GCI; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea – Second Geneva Convention, hereinafter: GCII; Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War – Third Geneva Convention, hereinafter: GCIII; Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War – Fourth Geneva Convention,
hereinafter: GCIV),
(13) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly
known as European Convention of Human Rights, ECHR) of 1950,
(14) Convention relating to the status of Refugees of 1951,
(15) Convention on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 1965,
(16) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966,
(17) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966,
(18) American Convention on Human Rights of 1969,
(19)  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification  Techniques  (commonly  known  as  Environmental  Modification  Convention,
ENMOD) of 1976 with additional protocols,
(20) Convention on the Elimination of Women Discrimination against cedaw of1979,
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(21) Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of  certain convention weapons
which may be deemed injurious (2) of 1980,
(22) African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Convention) of 1981,
(23)  Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or
Punishment (Torture Convention) of 1984,
(24) Convention on rights of a child (CRC) of 1989,
(25) Statute of international Criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia (1993),
(26) San Remo Manual of the international law applicable at Sea (1994),
(27) Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (1994),
(28) advisory Opinion on legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (1996),
(29) Asian Human Rights Charter of 1998,
(30) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome statute, 1998),
(31) Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict (1999),
(32) Convention of Rights of persons with disabilities (CRPD) and Optional Protocol to that
Convention.
The  research  generated  useful  connections  in  theoretical  some  of  which  are  worthwhile
sharing as discussed hereafter below.
2.1. Human rights and the model for disability rights
It was very apparent from the analysis of the international instruments that none of these are
instruments was able to generate the term disability before 1966. After 2006 the human rights
have adopted the CRPD as an instrument that was strictly meant to cater for person with
disabilities as the most disproportionately affected group. The 1980s marked the zenith of
disability movements.124 This period paved the way for the year of the disabled.  This was
very parent that this was to latter stir a wide range of human right reforms specifically to
accord  better  considerations  to  persons  with  disabilities.  In  fact  it  become  clearer  that
disability rights were only limited to certain groups while majority of person with disabilities
remained without any economic support, employment support.125 To make matters worse the
situations of persons with mental or physical disabilities were all marred with this attitude of
self-pity the equality.126 The model of approach clearly reduced person with disabilities to
being  merely  objects.127 Indeed  with  such  as  perspective  about  person  with  disabilities
instilled a sense of social stigma and stereotypes that were hardly condemned and if anything
most  of  these  were  condoned.  The best  illustration  of  the  attitude  that  societies  had  and
perhaps still have is well demonstrated by some the medieval provisions of laws of armed
conflicts. In spite the unchallenged and moreover unchanged shade of laws of armed conflicts,
at  the  presence  of  the CRPD has  gone a  long way to  mention  about  the action of  some
protection to person with disabilities even in those situations of insurgencies or armed conflict
up risings.128 It must be indeed understood that just like other types of rights and struggle for
freedom even the rights of persons with disabilities have come a long way.129 It has made
124 M. Price,  Defining Mental Disabilities [in:] D. Lennard, (ed.),  The Disability Studies Reader, 4th edition,
Routledge, New York – London 2013, p. 298.
125 Guidance on matters  taken into account  in  determining Questions relating to the definition of  disability,
London: HMS0. (ISSUED 25TH July 1996, also Disability Discrimination Regulation 1996, SI 1996/1455.
126 T. Hammarberg, Disability Rights from Charity to Equality, European Human Rights Law Review 2011, no. 6,
p. 638; 641.
127 C.  Cojocariu,  Handicapping  Rules:  The  Overly  Restrictive  Application  of  Admissibility  Criteria  by  the
European Court of Human Rights to Complaints Concerning Disabled Persons, European Human Rights Law
Review 2011, no. 6, p. 688.
128 C. Murray, Moving towards rights-based mental health law: the limits of legislative reform, Irish Jurist 2013,
vol. 49, p. 161, 163.
129 M. Oliver, Understanding disability from theory to practice, Macmillan Press 1996 p. 63.
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human rights to develop mechanism by which persons with disabilities to be handled with a
relatively deserving degree of respect for humanity, dignity and bodily integrity.130 This has
been never  been attained on sliver  plate  but  consistent  reforms have made.  Certainly the
economical abilities for many of the developing states have remained a challenge to comply
with a wide range of obligations under the CRPD Convention.
Independent  living  remains  among  the  fundamentally  notable  rights  that  have  strongly
developed through the promulgation of the CRPD. The above notion is more projected by the
language of the 2006 CRPD.131 Such provisions are meant to restore a reasonable degree of
personal autonym and well personal authority for persons with disabilities. By and large it
becomes even apparent that the legal traditions strongly discredited the social presence and
visibility of persons with disability in virtually all sphere of life. As thus case it must notably
recalled that common law rules on insanity denied all manner of legal capacity the persons
regarded to experience disabilities would have enjoyed. For examples under the contract for
sales of gods it is crystal clear that the person with mental disabilities claimed to lack the legal
capacity to be in position make the contact.132 This had implications such as the denial of
rights  such as  undertaking contracts  of  employment  with  any employer,  the  right  to  rent
houses in day to day life was also constrained in this case none of the landlords could ever
take the risk of undertaking a contract with a person of mental disability,133 similar the rights
to make sound decisions of consenting to medical treatment was also strongly denied from
this same group of persons.134  The most important is the right to sue as the pinnacle of other
rights was also definitely deprived. It must be understood in light of the above discussing the
people  with  disabilities  were  essentially  deprived of  a  great  deal  of  personal  and human
rights.135 In others wards the CRPD partly stems from the presence of such unchallenged
injustices surely need immediate legal redress. It is therefore clearly in the above examples
that the presence of disabilities could just jeopardise the rights of person with disabilities even
in times of peace.
Having said so, it equally vital clarifying at this juncture that disability is and has always been
broader than what most municipal laws seemed to understand, respect or even seemed to
accept. In other wards the human rights instruments such as the CRPD can clearly make it
apparent  that  the  current  perspective  is  wide  enough  to  cover  mental  and  physical
disabilities.136 In  fact  before the enactment  of  the laws of disability from an international
spectrum it  more  than  clear  that  most  of  the  disabled  persons  with  invisible,  intangible
disability the suffered from challenges of limited legislative framework that would effectively
encompass then into the legislative protection.
The phases of disability rights have been transformed thought the following phases. In this
regard the very first stage was defining the interests of persons with disabilities as needs. The
challenges with this approach it relied on the medical model. This model is founded on a view
that persons with disabilities with are sick and there they need the need to undergo treatment
as one of the best ways to make them become normal. This varied for examples those in
mobility limitation were understood as person that are expected to undertake clinical medical
130 M. Waterstone,  Foreword: Significance of  the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 2010, vol. 33, p. 1-6.
131 O. Lewis, Advancing legal capacity jurisprudence, European Human Rights Law Review 2011, no. 6,  p. 704.
132 M.A. Stein, Quick Overview of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
Its Implications for Americans with Disabilities, Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter 2007, vol. 31, no.
5, p. 679, 681.
133 M. Price, Defining..., op. cit., p. 298.
134 Article  12 and  13  of  the  UNCPD 2000.  See  also  S.  Fredman,  Discrimination  law,  2nd  edition,  Oxford
University Press 2011, p. 98.
135 J. Rehman, International Human Right Law, 2nd edition, Person Education Limited, London 2010,  p. 618.
136 C. Cojocariu, Handicapping Rules..., op. cit., p. 691.
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diagnostic as seen the case of Shtukaturov v. Russia137. Second model is when human rights
are based model has been adopted. This is a far more effective and indeed disability friendly
as than the medical model. The latter is more appropriate in the medical model which tends to
resonates with very notions of control and care. I the above context the nature of problems
faced in insurmountable.
The above examples are clearly demonstrating the fact that on several occasions even in times
of  peace  persons  with  disabilities  have  been  unfairly  treated.   The  above  challenges
encountered  by  persons  with  disabilities  are  just  being  to  get  changed  in  recent  times
following the presence of urgency of the CRPD. It most cases the counties that sign up the
CRPD has continued to rely on the dualism theory. The above theory has basically known for
regarding internationals law as a separate and distinctive branch of law from the domestic
law.138 This also implies that such countries will never automatically allow the application of
international  laws into their  domestic  unless  a  supportive municipal  legalisation has  been
enacted in  their  domestic  legalization.   In  this  case it  must  comprehend that  it  might  be
interesting to  compare  the models  adopted  by the countries  that  rely on the dualism and
those that are based on monism. 
2.2. International humanitarian law and model on disability rights
Furthermore  the  metamorphosis    of  the  rights  for  persons  with  disabilities  been  more
embraced by certain braches of public international law than others. Regarding the provisions
of protection to those with disabilities are never anywhere close to agendas of socials equity,
affirmative  action,  equal  protection  and  many  others  as  assumed  under  contemporary
developments in human rights. In the same vain the research carried using software thinking
methodologies, it was clearly reflected that even the word disability hardly surfaces in most
instruments of international humanitarian laws as shown in the proceeding diagram.
Figure 1 shows the word frequency puzzle for some of major verbs, nouns and characters
used by IHL documents.
137 Application  No.  44009/05,  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85611.  See  also
Guzzardi v. Italy, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57498.
138 M. Waterstone, Foreword: Significance..., op. cit., p. 6.
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There are however on the very few occasions whenever and wherever the LOAC and state
manuals of armed forced considered persons with disabilities. It is very clearly from most of
the State documents and LOAC that these persons were considered not necessary because
disability was neither because of disability being part of their bodily identity or their bodily
personality, but purely considered since their disabilities were a consequence of working as
armed military men in armed conflicts.
Therefore in as much as on the whole awareness of persons with disability seemed totally
insignificant and to a greater extent completely ignored, the only exceptional to the above
observation include: the Lieber coded of 1893, the third Geneva Convention and Additional
protocol  1  (hereinafter:  API),  as  discussed  latter  in  their  chronological  order.  As  already
mentioned that even international humanitarian laws were framed upon a fallacy that special
protection   to persons with disabilities ought to be given since these were a helpless and
needy batch of fallen war victims of war and thus surrendering was a legal perquisite for the
bodily human treatment.  It becomes quite clear from the context most State armed forces a
strongly associated and perhaps continue associating being disabled with being weak, helpless
and sheer need of help due to loss of battle of falling prefer to the rigours of the armed
conflicts. As wether the CRPD has helped or might ever help to resolve this attitude which the
army tends  to  have  towards  persons  with  disabilities.139 That  remains  completely another
debatable aspect for another time.  The stereotypical attitudes of how the armed forces look
down on persons with disabilities has never waned but instead continues to resonates with
habits and behaviours of many commanders in charge of armed troops that perceive persons
with disabilities as less able  bodied men and women without  capability to make a sound
contributions to activities of armed hostilities.140 The divide between the combatants and their
poor interactions with the world of the deaf, blind or dumb makes it crystal clear that legal
redress  through  more  integrative  frameworks  are  necessary.   Perhaps  this  attitude  armed
forces had upheld continues to explain the limitations of extending adequate protection to
persons with disabilities. To make the discussion more precise and express and account shall
be given of the manner in which the identified provisions of international humanitarian law
have in past dealt with this rather obscure and invisible group of minorities.
139 Captain L.E. Fitzgibbons, Disability benefits for discharged soldiers law, regulation and procedure, Current
Legal Thought 1946, p. 184.
140 B.  Gauthier,  War  Crimes  in  International  Versus  Non-International  Armed  Conflicts:  New Wine in  Old
Wineskins?, International Criminal Law Review 2008, vol. 8, no. 1-2, p. 319, 321.
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2.2.1. Lieber code of 1893 and disability
Under the lieber code instructions were issued out to American soldier on their preparation to
the battlefield.
“[...] except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or
elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are
prisoners  of  war,  and  as  such  exposed  to  the  inconveniences  as  well  as  entitled  to  the
privileges of a prisoner of war.141”
It is apparent that the duty to protect under the above law was framed on premises that the
role of armed conflicts is to certainly to cause disabilities but accord humane treatment strictly
to those civilian or combatants that it has in the due process disabled. It remains unclear from
the  context  and  conceptual  framework  as  to  wether  room  is  given  to  acknowledge  the
possibility of the several disabilities resulting from completely different factors.
“Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on the ground, or
prisoners captured by other troops.”142
In fact it seems like one of the CRPD’s objectives is to project more emphasis on equality and
equitable distribution of amenities persons with disabilities. A distributive model that should
be adopted without discrimination and preferential treatment of persons with disabilities on
the basis of the underlying causal factors or circumstances a consequence under which such
persons became have disabled.143  Related to the above the habit of looking at with disabilities
as powerless is strongly embedded in laws of war. Therefore in becomes ever more apparent
that   situations of armed conflicts are remarkably importance as far as understanding areas
that need reforms for the better protection of person with disabilities.
Accordingly the code outlawed the soldiers from further action whenever there was evidence
of disabilities as a result of the armed conflict. This was through the chain of command that
instigates  the  concept  of  command  authoritarian  leadership.  The  models  of  command
leadership accounts for why the Lieber code imposed orders that were thereafter followed the
different parties to the armed conflict.   In this case it must be appreciated that the above
protection was also stressed. It is also relevant to note the aspects of care framed purely of
control  than  dignified  concern  of  disabled  people  as  persons  deserving  a  humanitarian
attention.
2.2.2. The Third Geneva Convention of 1949
The nature of relationship between the parties involved under Geneva Convention is based on
a rather misguided view that disability are anomalies that would under normal circumstances
attract medical attention. In as much as this view holds sense with respect to war related cases
of disabilities somewhat it can pose a potential danger of treating all disabled people as needy,
sick,  and  miserable  and  therefore  a  comparably  undervalued  image  of  persons  with
disabilities. This is indeed very likely  especially in comparison other persons that are deemed
to constitute the normal able bodied men and women with this fallacy of posing required
sanity as  the  rightful  thinking  member  of  the  community.  In  other  aspects  there  is  clear
element  of  dependence,  control  and  a  condoned  sense  of  dominance  in  laws  of  armed
conflicts with regards to the conception of persons with disabilities.
141 Lieber code article 49.
142 Lieber code article 61 and 71.
143 I. Mugabi, Protection of vulnerable groups during armed conflicts, US-China Law Review 2014, Vol. 11, p.
1273-1274.
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“Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of […] disability arising out of
work shall be referred to the Power on which he depends, through the Protecting Power. In
accordance with Article 54, the Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner of war
concerned with a statement showing the nature of the injury or disability, the circumstances in
which it arose and particulars of medical or hospital treatment given for it.”144
In this context the above law must not be overly criticized in light of the likely amputation or
even mutilation that might often prevail in times of armed conflict hostilities than in times of
peace. In this regard there it is more than clear the single based approach has been for long
embedded under the war-disability relationship. The approach attracts critic for over usage of
bodily humanity and bodily dignity with regards to perceiving the law a watchman of an
armed conflict as causing agent of disabilities than a regulating the armed conflict-disability
relationship as an impacting agent of persons with disabilities during and after occurrence of
such conflicts. The latter view must attract social legal research in the suffering encountered
by persons that may already bear any disability even before occurrence of an armed conflict.
The need for recapturing the conceptualization the broader spectrum of the armed conflict and
disability relationship is still long overdue. In fact the above relationship remains apparently
far from restoring the descent institutions necessary if  the social  and physical requites  of
persons with disabilities are to survive situations of armed conflicts as the worst of times that
continues to be dreaded by mankind even today than ever before especially in the Middle
eastern  Gulf  and  most  of  the  sub-Saharan  African.145 Of  course  without  overlooking  the
rationale upon which such protections are founded, such as restoring a reasonable sense of
humanitarian considerations amidst the harmful and indeed appalling bodily effects of armed
conflicts.  Yes indeed during armed conflicts and situations of threshold of the fundamental
standards for humanitarian protection has often been unsurprisingly compromised. It would
be indeed probable and yet absolutely wrong to rely on the civilian and combatant divide to
justify grounds of preferential  treatment of disabled prisoners of wars, veterans of former
combatants under international humanitarian law. The above view could be clearly exampled
by the proceeding text from GCIII.
“All prisoners of war suffering from the following disabilities as the result of trauma: loss of
limb, paralysis, particular or other disabilities, when this disability is at least the loss of a hand
or a foot, or the equivalent of the loss of a hand or a foot.”146
The challenging conditions of armed conflicts have often posed insurmountable damage not
only to combatants and prisoners of war but to the more vulnerable members of the civilian
population. In this respect the disabled women would be even more prone to increasing cases
of rape have often been worsen.147
2.2.3. The Additional Protocol 1 of 1977
“Article 8. For the purposes of this Protocol: "Wounded" and "sick" mean persons, whether
military or civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or
disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility.
These terms also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may be in
need of immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and
144 GCIII article 68.
145 S. Meyers,  Wounded Warriors or One of the Crowds?: Civil War, Citizenship, and Disability in Nicaragua
[in:] G. Wolbring (ed.),  Disability Studies and Ability Studies: Two Lenses to Investigate Peace, Peace Studies
Journal 2013, vol. 6, issue 4, p. 22-23.
146 Ibid. 
147 M.B. Smyth, Injured and disabled casualties of the Northern Ireland conflict: Issues in immediate and long
term treatment, care and support, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 2013, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 244-266.
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who refrain from any act of hostility.“148
In the above case there is a good case to assert that API adopts a completely different model
compared  to  the  equal  rights  and  treatment  that  is  more  reflected.  The  understanding  of
disability has under a wide range if changes over a period of time. The medical model was the
medal that according to which disability becomes perceivable as a medical problem than a
type  of  identity.149 The  software  system  thinking  tool  deserves  credit  following  the
contribution in elucidating the manner in which disability has been perceived by the laws of
armed conflict.150 In the same capacity the capability, humanity and dignity of persons with
disabilities can be easily undermined.151 This happens in cases where the medical model has
been practised. Perhaps the above argument greatly explains why there has been shift in the
understanding of disability from merely special needs persons with disability to the view that
the law must disabled persons a rights based models.152  It was from the weaknesses of the
medical model that the need to adopt a rights based model became a better alternative for
persons with disabilities and this giving deserving their best interest better redress.  In the
same ethos the medical model was condemned for its self imposed sense of external control,
in addition to the denial of authority and subsequently autonomy which was followed by the
denial of eve n reasonable consideration for any room for authority. The medical model is a
contradictory to of the recent concept of independent living.  Actually manner in which the
international humanitarian law perceives persons with disabilities it all creates the situation in
which these persons are subject the unjust controlled.
2.3. Aspects of State personality, State sovereignty and State responsibility in law
Today the  attributes  of  State  personality,  State  sovereignty  and  State  responsibility  have
remained as applicable as they used to be a few centuries ago, but this time modified with
exceptions.153  It  is  therefore  unsurprising  to  come  across  commentators  whose  views
highlight the criticisms associated with the rights of Statehood sovereignty in some conflicts.
Such criticisms are a result of State authorities indulging in acts of armed conflict violence.
This is well illustrated from the case of Van Anraat v Netherlands,154 by the behavior of Iraq
government  towards  the  Kurdish  communities  Northern  Iraq.  Such  State  behaviors  are
contrary to State obligations and signify a failure by some of the State authorities to comply
with the nature of humanitarian obligations,  even after  ratifying the relevant Conventions
under international law. 155
As a result some of the commentators have detested State authorities that can afford to torture
their  own  civilians  including  the  most  vulnerable  minorities  instead  rendering  protection
especially in non-international armed conflicts. The above trends constitute tendencies that
Djoyou has described as ruthless and dehumanizing and yet  the perpetuating parties have
148 API article 8.
149 G.T. Couser, Disability Like Narrative, and Representation [in:] D.J. Lennard, The Disability..., op. cit., p.256.
150 Lieber code 61; see also GCIII article 68.
151 UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency Policy Development and Evaluation Service; M. Mirza (ed.) Unmet needs
and diminished opportunities: disability, displacement and humanitarian healthcare  (June 2011) viewed from:
http://www.unhcr.org/4e0dbdb29.pdf [access 29 September 2014].
152 L. Clements, Opinion piece, European Human Rights Law Review 2011, no. 6, p. 633.
153 D. Harris,  Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th ed., Thomson Reuters 2010, p. 115; see also T.
Hillier,  Source Book on Public International Law, Cavendish Publishing Company 1998, p. 204 and S. Zifcak,
The responsibility to protect [in:] M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2010.
154 Van  Anraat  v  Netherlands,  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3204004-
3565665.
155 D.  Turns,  The  law  of  armed  conflict  (international  and  humanitarian  law) [in:]  M.D.  Evans  (ed.),
International Law, op. cit.
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often inflicted minority without impunity.156  Such tragedies have happened and may continue
happening unless assertive action is taken by regional and international human courts against
all parties that take in the different types of armed conflicts. Indeed some scholars contend
that  the  above  situations  are  only  redeemable  through  the  regional  and  international
institutions increasing exceptions to State sovereignty while responding with humanitarian
intervention.157
Affa'a and Christakis are typical examples of scholars that subscribe to the above view.  The
views of Affa'a and Christakis regarding humanitarian intervention are of relevance to this
study in understanding the justifications for such intervention whenever vulnerable groups are
affected during non-international armed conflicts. Following the comparably higher levels of
physical  and psychologically harm inflicted upon persons with disabilities in some of the
recent  cases  of  non-international  armed  conflicts  more  suffering  would  seem  to  be
experienced in absence of humanitarian intervention.  In that case only one State might claim
to be exerting proactive and pragmatically measures against  its own domestic belligerents
thus  preference  of  unjustified  external  intervention.158 The  need  for  global  security  by
countering  acts  of  terrorism  has  also  curved  more  exceptions  to  the  traditions  of  State
sovereignty.159 Affa'a also defines State sovereignty as the practice of non-intervention and
non-interference with the internal affairs of another State.160
Furthermore as far as reciprocity and armed conflicts are concerned, it is equally important to
appreciate that compliance with the protective duties of States under the LOAC is mutually
and easily attained through reciprocity by both parties regardless of their legal capacity or
State personality under public international law.161  Perhaps the desire to attain a reasonable
degree and an enforceable degree to the standards of reciprocity may partly account for the
latter changes made on the LOAC. These latter changes relate to enacting new rules that later
became API and APII for international and non-international armed conflicts  respectively.
This idea of drafting proposed rules for API and APII was first proposed in 1969 to during an
international conference in Istanbul.162 The proposed rules enshrined contributions from by the
International Committee for Red Cross (hereafter ICRC).163  Most important for disabilities
scholars is that API and APII were based on a rather outmoded and irreconcilable model in
comparison to the present day developments on disability rights.
Additionally the proposed rules were also intended to protect ICRC staff during the execution
of  humanitarian  support  with  regions  inflicted  by  armed  conflicts  although  it  remains
debatable to argue this protection is closer to be achieved.164 Probably if the LOAC enshrined
under the Additional Protocols is strictly followed by all participants in all types of armed
conflicts, then instances of indiscriminate attacks on the Red Cross office would be greatly
156 S.A. Djoyou Kanga, A call for a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples. Rights on the rights
of persons with disabilities in Africa, African Journal of International and Comparative Law 2013, vol. 21, no. 2,
p. 219-220.
157 T. Christakis, Emperor has no clothes; The secondary role of African regional organizations in recent armed
conflicts in Africa, American Society of International Law Proceedings 2013, vol. 10, no. 7, p. 327, 329.
158 H.R Fabri,  Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries been Significant Redrawn?  [in:] P.
Alston, E. Macdonald (eds.), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press 2008.
159 E.  Macdonald,  P.  Alston,  Sovereignty  Human  Rights,  Security:  Armed  Intervention  and  Fundamental
Problems  of International Law [in:] P. Alston, E. Macdonald (eds.), Human Rights..., op. cit.
160 M.  Affa'a  Mindzie,  Intervention  and  Protection  in  African  Crisis  Situations:  Evolution  and  Ethical
Challenges, Criminal Justice Ethnics 2010, vol. 29., no. 2, p. 174, 176.
161 C. Byron,  A Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of International Humanitarian Law by Human
Rights Bodies, Virginia Journal of International Law 2007, vol. 47, no. 4, p. 840, 883; see also H.J. Steiner,
International protection of human rights, M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, op. cit.
162 A. Robert, R. Guelff, Documents on the Law of War, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2008, p. 419.
163 International Committee for Red Cross (hereafter: ICRC) offers support like food, shelter, medical all war
affected victims including disabled civilian in armed conflict territories.
164 L.C. Green, The contemporary law of armed conflict, 3rd ed., Manchester University Press 2008, p. 70.
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minimized.  Take for instance the shelling during the armed conflict between Ukrainian and
the Russian separatist that claimed the life of Pasquier.165  The above tragedy happened while
the Red Cross worker executed humanitarian services at the Red Cross administration offices
in the rebel controlled town of Donetsk.166
Before proceeding to explore the background of API and APII a critic that deserves to be
highlighted concerns the inadequate inclusiveness of disabled people in policies and practices
of many of the humanitarian organizations. This should cite observations by ethnographic
studies carried out under the auspices of the UNHCR in of June 2011. The findings reported a
lack  of  inclusiveness  of  persons  with  disabilities  in  their  humanitarian  intervention
arrangements. The same humanitarian organizations operate during both non-international and
international  types  and  yet  they  usually  have  rarely  less  inclusive  and  responsive  health
program to cover the unmet needs of persons with disabilities living in war displacement
camps. Even though the findings of the report suggest that the above problem is common in
all types of armed conflict as long as there are eventual cases of civilian displacement into
intermittent camps during the ongoing armed conflict. This criticism is somehow an appeal
for more inclusion of persons with disabilities in programs and planning of organizations like
Red Cross. Especially if these humanitarian organizations are to ever improve their standards
of distributive equity in their services.167
In the interim by 1971 and 1972 the proposed drafts of the Protocols were availed to for
review based on the  contributions  of  IHL experts  that  had  convened in  Geneva.  On this
occasion  even  the  representative  groups  from liberation  movements  were  also  invited  as
attend and participate in the reviewing and deliberation process. Parties behind the formation
of  API and APII  included;  the liberation  movements,  the ICRC and States  who were  all
involved in the one way or another.168 In that case the last are two examples comprise of
subjects  having  legal  personality  in  public  international  law.169 Whereas  the  liberation
movements are neither legitimate entities under public international law nor had statehood
rights. The distinctiveness of the participants of the formation is indeed a precursor to the
scope of parties to whom the extensiveness in scope of these protective obligations applies.
However as far as the voting process is concerned, the liberation movements are not allowed
to vote basically because they are non-state actors.170
Consequently  the  above  developments  marked  the  timely  reforms  of  LOAC  that  were
eventually paved way for the ratification of the two Additional protocols API and APII.  The
reforms were never specifically meant for person with disabilities even though this stage APII
begins referring to person with disabilities for the very first time.171 Apart from the absence of
much  on  protection  of  disabled  people,  perhaps  the  formation  process  has  lesson  to  be
emulated if future human rights instruments are to apply to all types of armed conflicts such
as the merits of adopting more comprehensive consultative formation mechanisms so as to
develop even more holistically binding regime of LOAC.
Perhaps the same reforms went a long way in improving the applicability of LOAC to cope
with changing trends of the contemporary armed conflicts.    In addition to the above the
165 M.  Tsvetkova,  Swiss  Red Cross  worker  killed  by  shell  in  Ukraine's  Donetsk,  Reuters,  2  October  2014,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/02/uk-ukraine-crisis-redcrossidUKKCN0HR24Z20141002?
feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews [access 3 October 2014].
166 A. Kolyandr, G.L. White, Swiss Red Cross Worker Killed by Ukraine Shelling, Wall Street Journal, 2 October
2014,  http://online.wsj.com/articles/swiss-red-cross-worker-killed-by-ukraine-shelling-1412272753 [access  4
October 2013].
167 M. Mirza, Unmet needs and diminished opportunities: disability, displacement and humanitarian healthcare ,
UNHCR,  The  UN  Refugee  Agency  Policy  Development  and  Evaluation  Service,  New  Issues  in  Refugee
Research, Research Peper no. 212, http://www.unhcr.org/4e0dbdb29.pdf [access 29 September 2014].
168 A. Robert, R. Guelff, Documents..., op. cit., p.  419.
169 T. Hillier, Source Book..., op. cit., p.  204
170 Ibid. p. 419.
171 APII Article  8.
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reforms in LOAC can be deemed as a timely response to the limitations that had caused the
unevenness in the binding effect of the Geneva Convections and as such mitigating single
sided application of humanitarian obligations.  Hence the obligations are extended to both
parties of non-international armed conflicts, unlike for human rights agreements.172  As far as
armed conflicts are concerned the State responsibilities are therefore derived from the ratified
the human rights and humanitarian duties of member States.
Two observations should be made on the development of API and APII. First and foremost is
the holistically consultative mode of involving numerous parties that in one way or another
get  involved in  activities  during  armed conflicts.  That  characteristic  is  remarkable  and it
notably makes API and APII distinctive. It in fact makes the formation processes of APII and
API different from human rights instruments like the CRPD.
Further to the formation process of API and APII is the capability of its consultative model to
cater for the responsibilities of the various parties that are usually involved across the broader
spectrum of the different forms armed conflicts. This is perhaps yet another unique aspect
with the protocols that  is  worthwhile acknowledging and according tribute.    This  makes
protocol  well  modified considering the variety of the armed conflicts  and involvement  of
various parties in today’s changing landscape of armed conflicts.173  In which case human
rights must emulate similar modifications to enabled instruments like the CRPD assign to
each of the respective parties a substantial degree of obligations. That seems helpful if human
rights instruments are to ever claim respect from all actors taking part in the in the various
types armed conflicts.  In this way the impacts of armed conflicts on disable people are to
become gradually alleviated and appreciated.
In  relation  to  the  above  the  aforementioned  obligations  wherever  accepted  ought  to  be
respected  by the  ratifying  State  of  the  respective  instruments.  Accordingly supposing the
obligation to protect is equally and inclusively construed or applied then such protection must
be in position to benefit all civilians regardless of their disabilities are physical and mental by
nature. The persons with disabilities must also be made aware of the need to refrain from acts
that broaden fractions that would disunities due to succumbing to divisions peculiar with ideas
that tend emanate from certain types armed conflicts.174 These ideas could influence persons
with disabilities behave in manner which persons supports with one of the sides taking part in
the  armed  conflicts.175 Admittedly the  above  view can  attract  criticism,  as  it  sounds  like
denying  persons  with  disabilities  liberty  express  to  their  affiliations  and  affection  to
theoretical factors upon which armed conflicts are based.
Wacks is of the view   that affections and affiliations could justify the reasons as to why some
of the aggrieved parties may resort to relying on any of the different types of armed conflicts.
To him peace supersedes any other alternatives used to resolve the disputes of injustice.176 It
can be contended that occurrence of armed conflicts is a day to day reality and States will
continue experiencing any of the different types of armed conflicts, in spite of having peaceful
alternatives that are probably the most ideal ways of dealing with the internal and external
disputes.177  Arguably under international law the protective obligations that a State owes to
civilians an instrumentally crucial irrespective of the parties and types of armed conflicts such
172 C. Byron, A Blurring of the Boundaries..., op. cit., p. 841, 883.
173 L. Cameron, R. Everly,  Conceptualizing the Administration of Territory by International Actors, European
Journal of International Law 2010, vol. 21, no. 1, p. 221, 230.
174 M. B. Smyth, Injured..., op. cit., p. 37.
175 S. Meyers, Wounded..., op. cit., p. 22-23.
176 R. Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Legal Theory, Oxford University Press 2005, p.
29.    
177 L. Cameron, R. Everly, Conceptualizing..., op. cit., p. 221, 230.
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a State might find its self involved.  Unfortunately it is sad to note that amidst the influence of
international relations the obligatory nature of protective roles has often been ignored by most
governments of the war tone States often in the name of pursuing their political or economic
ambitions.178
Researchers  in  armed  conflicts  have  noted  as  to  how  the  influence  of  such  political  or
economic factors is a prevalent prototype that has been noted to comprise State compliance
with humanity and humanitarian obligations in several types of armed conflicts.179 Therefore
the role of political or economic factors is neither dependant on the type the armed conflict
nor the legal capacity of the parties involved in the armed conflict.180
The  above  point  is  in  fact  a  justification  for  reconsidering  the  long  overdue  need  for
establishing stronger institutional frameworks that are international in scope, autonomous in
nature and authoritatively empowered to evaluate the legitimacy of armed conflict behaviors
in relation to the feasibility of potential threats to disability rights.181 This can go a long way in
creating more awareness on disability rights irrespective of the type of armed conflict. As of
now the LOAC are extensive enough to regulate not just the behaviors of States but also to
curb the violence of non-state actors in non-international conflict.182 Unfortunately, as far as
the human rights laws applicable are concerned there has been this tendency of continuing
with the State based model of apportioning and enforcing international obligations.183  Such
an approach can be huge limitation whenever attempts are made to extend the scope of human
rights instruments to non-State parties of non-international armed conflicts.
The examples of the aforementioned international instruments include those that were already
discussed and explained in first chapter with regard to the States’ protect responsibilities in
international law during and after situations of armed conflicts.  That is to say the wether in
the midst of armed the different armed conflicts the law effectively regulates how States ought
to undertake the responsibilities to protect civilians in general but with more attention to how
such  protection  could  be  subsequently  applied  to  the  benefit  of  the  disabled  as  more
vulnerable civilians wherever they find themselves caught up in the different types of armed
conflicts.
In the same spirit Affa'a makes a convincingly persuasive criticism against the notion of State
sovereignty.184  She contends overemphasizing State sovereignty can be a barrier to room for
humanitarian intervention. The above argument is even more convincing in situations where a
non-international  armed  conflict  happens  in  a  State  with  already  a  bad  reputation  for
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.   As a matter of fact the issue of humanitarian
intervention is even more important now than ever before. A view can be supported by the
increasing cases of armed conflicts.  Moreover incidents of armed conflicts are increasing
with little attention to given to the dignity of the most vulnerable and minority groups.185
Humanitarian intervention is defined as the actual use of force or threatening to use it by a
State, group of States or an international organization for the sole purpose of protecting the
nationals from a targeted State from the continued deprivation of internationally recognized
178 Human Rights Watch Report, At a Crossroads, Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years after the US-Led Invasion,
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181 G.T. Couser, Disability..., op. cit., p. 256.
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human rights.186   By referring to the role of the African Union in armed conflicts, Christakis
seems to suggest more reliance on humanitarian interventions while overcoming the barrier of
State sovereignty.187 In as much as at a glance Affa'a work looked insightful in many aspects
of other vulnerable groups to armed conflict violence such as women and children,188 just like
most humanitarian scholars her study excludes the already indivisible group of persons with
disabilities.   It  is  of  no  wander  therefore  that  even  State  actors  have  often  ignored  any
obligation to do with these vulnerable in most types of armed conflicts.189  At least identifying
the  existence  of  the  disabled  group  of  persons  would  have  sufficed  in  minimizing  the
consequential damages.
2.3.1 Disability protection in texts and legal context under public international law
Protection is a commonly used verb not just with the instruments of public international law
but also in manuals of the several states authorities. In this respect is becomes indeed clearer
human rights are intended to impose an obligation upon states to protect t their nationals from
the harmful,  dehumanising and cruel practices utterly degrading to humanity. In this above
context it must be clearly understood that most of the spheres of public international law are
centred towards states as already highlighted in the earlier explanation. Subsequently in this
discussion the issues to be resolved in deciding as to wether available evidence is sufficient
for arriving at conclusions from the legal context can reflects some degree of consistent. The
challenge has ever been the absence of adequate the limitation that might arise due to the
comparably varied global nature of legal text and context in which public international law
tends to interact with the respective branches  municipal  law. On this occasion it must be
appreciated that the complexities of the issues from the cultural dimensions across the broader
spectrum tends to have impacts based on concepts of cultural relatively. In this case cultural
relativity is a rather strange concept but it has been used in cases where states are seeking to
circumvent certain obligation as under internal law. Conversely the public domains continue
to grapple with attaining common interpretations within the respective municipal laws. There
is yet another challenge of poor legalities for protective framework the rewards from charities.
On this occasion disability rights are continue to struggle with the subtle attention some of
States are willing to express in international law and municipal  to aspects of protecting rights
of  persons  with  disabilities.  The  major  supporting  theories  that  underlies  the  controversy
include the instances where states have preferred reliance on the either the concept of dualism
or the concept of cultural relativity.190 The persistence of even variations in the municipals
systems across the world might equally impact the ease and certainty in enforcing rights of
persons with disabilities. In this context the reference is made to the presence of both the
common law and the civil system of legal traditions. It must be equally appreciated that such
legal traditions have interacted with the aspects of disability in comparably different ways.191
This is yet a vital aspect that deserves to be mentioned at this juncture. Common laws are
those jurisdictions  whose legal  institutions  derive their  decisions  upon previously decided
case law. In this context it must appreciated that disability is such a newly developing concept
that judicial institutions hardily have evidence of previously  decided upon which to draw
186 M. Affa'a Mindzie, Intervention..., op. cit., p. 174, 176.
187 T. Christakis, Emperor has no clothes..., op. cit., p. 327, 329.
188 M.  Ron,  M. Hannah,  Comment:  The CRPD and children  with disabilities,  Australian  International  Law
Journal 2013, vol. 20, p. 17, 21.
189 S. R. Barriga, Dispatches..., op. cit.
190 J.A. Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the
Post-Cold War Era,  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2005, vol. 54, issue 2, p. 459, 462; A.D.
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Quarterly 1985, vol. 4, no. 7, p. 514, 517.
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further  reference.192 On the other hand international shows evidence of poor complementarity
and if anything in terms of the protection derived human rights and international humanitarian
law are undisputedly inadequate to have substantial attributes of irreconcilable concepts on
disability.  That makes public international law of duality deserve more clarity and further
academic scrutiny for justify the need for consistence if this areas of law is to be effectively
streamlined.
Civil jurisdictions are those jurisdictions hat are intended to follow statutory codes in deciding
matter on a case by case basis. In this case it must be appreciated that the challenges a that are
involved in this nature of legal traditions courts would decides matters that relates to issues of
human rights violations solemnly depending on the provisions in the municipal law.193 In it is
perhaps becoming apparent that the presence of functioning regional body these in regional
bodies are already.194 On this case the EU is a classical example of bodies that are effectively
engaging with their respective member states are resolving the problems of disability rights.195
By and large to impact of the numerous forms of legal systems across the word deserves to be
given  some  attention.196 In  the  same  accord  it  must  be  appreciated  that  courts  are  the
cornerstones  of  these  rights  even  though  the  denial  of  legal  capacity  to  persons  with
disabilities has often been yet another limitation to the enforcement of their rights. Actually
this is one area that several proponents have suggested needs enabling reviews to person with
disabilities.
In a nutshell even in the same regional integration some of the states might opt to reply on the
cultural relativism, other might prefer dualism. All these are forum through which the right of
persons with disabilities under the CRPPD.  In this case the situations after armed conflict
would find the notion of legal warrants in the legal text and contexts. Therefore the issue of
the global context operates on the basis of numerous underlying theories. The locus standi
rules under some of the procedure rules have tied down the affected persons with disabilities
following the presumption they the lack capacity to take legal action.
2.4. Civilian and combatants as perceived under lenses of disability models
The occurrence of armed conflicts is also associated with the use of the terms civilian and
combatants especially when referring the persons. Certainly in much as much on the face it
would sound like as if the persons with disabilities are covered according the reference to the
civilians under the Geneva Conventions to IV. Unfortunately the overly generally approach to
the  disabled  persons  has  often  created  a  degree  of  invisibility  to  this  vulnerable  group.
Accordingly API Armed conflicts  therefore rely on the principle  of  distinction to suggest
civilian as well as their  must at  all  times of the armed conflict  be distinguished from the
combatants.197 In  the above case it  is  undeniably apparent  that  the  law of  armed conflict
essentially accords the protection to the civilian categorically depending on how they are
classed.198  In the above case the presence of persons with mental or physical disabilities seem
to  undergo  rather  more  damaging  experiences  as  compared  to  those  civilians  without
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251, 260.
193 C. Tomuschat,  Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law,  European Journal of International Law
2010, vol. 21, no. 1, p. 15.
194 S.R.  Ratner,  Foreign  Occupation  and  International  Territorial  Administration:  The  Challenges  of
Convergence, European Journal of International Law 2005, vol. 16, no. 4, p. 695-696.
195 T. Hillier, Source Book..., op. cit.,  p. 204.
196 E. Macdonald, P. Alston, Sovereignty Human Rights..., op. cit.
197 L. Moir,  The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed
Conflicts to 1949, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1998, vol. 47, no. 2, p. 337.
198 API article 52 and 54.
70
disabilities. Conversely the occurrence of armed conflicts would therefore imply presence of
disabled civilians and disabled combatants the draftsmen of the CRPD hardily accord the
above issue attention and yet the above categorisation is remarkably important as far the cases
of armed conflicts are concerned.
2.4.1. Civilian with disabilities
In this case it is apparent that civilians with disabilities could range from a disabled woman to
a  disabled  child.199 On  several  children  and  women  with  disabilities  have  encountered
hindrances for one reason or another but more so this class would encompass the civilians that
might have had disabilities even long before the commencement of the armed conflict.200 The
above calibre would therefore comprise of persons whose disabilities might have been part of
their bodily experiences right from birth. That is opposed to those civilian whose experiences
and identifying with disability might have started with the occurrence of the armed conflict. In
the above case international humanitarian law in conflict with CRPD. Bearing in mind that the
CRPD is a Convention that was purely aimed at addressing issues of disability rights and it
assumes  a  unified,  generic  and  homogenous  class  of  persons  with  disabilities.201 On  the
contrarily armed conflict is a model example of a relationship that creates the problem of
fragmenting  persons  with  disabilities.202 In  fact  the  situations  of  armed  conflicts  become
inherently apparent and yet this a regrettably growing concerning in terms of the fractionising
persons with disabilities into groups.203  It is apparent that there is relatively higher number of
civilians that prone to cases of disabilities. As far as the post conflict entitlement to the rights
is concerned the CPRPD has never apportioned its right on the basis of any class or causes of
the disabilities.
2.4.2. Combatant with disabilities
In this case the international humanitarian laws seems to put substantial degree of protections
on the combatants as long they are maimed, amputated or affected by wounds or injury as
result of  taking part in  the armed conflicts. The two branches of public international (human
rights and international humanitarian law) are on this occasion citing disabilities under the
third Geneva Convention on simply grounds of protecting horse de combat.204 In the post
armed conflict  season the armed forces  that have surrendered as  hose de combat.205 Such
persons  would  perhaps  benefits  from policies  of  amnesty  and  such  leading  to  room for
transitional justice, of course depending on the types of conflict that they were involved.206  It
would seems unclear wether such persons would be exempted from enjoyed of their rights
under the CRPD. In this respect those involved have surrendered are fire harms. There other
symbols that  are used in the process of expressing communication.  This  sounds closer to
developing internationally inclusive communications patterns in times of conflicts.
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2.5. Second World War and the interactions with deaf communities
There is evidence that seems to suggest that deaf communities were involved in the armed
conflicts of the world war. It is apparent that in as much as under the communities of the deaf
and mute have been lately undermined as a helpless group of persons in the context of armed
conflicts  situations,  this  is  rather  irreconcilable  with  BBC  report  that  unveiled  evidence
showing the contributions of deaf communities to the first world war.207 It is rather unlikely
that persons with disabilities are always assumed to be unproductive.208 Therefore they are
able bodied persons like anyone else with capacity and ability to be supportive by performing
a few of the manageable activities of an armed conflict.209 This makes such a difference in
terms of how the communities perceives and conceives persons with disabilities. Thus there is
ever a possibility of persons with disabilities could be equally useful labour force in armed
conflict.210 The blind the mute among other related groups could play certainly useful roles in
times of armed conflicts. However at present day the current types of armed conflicts are
developed more  dangerous  typologies  to  the  bodily dignity and integrity of  persons  with
either visual, hearing or other forms of bodily impairments. Such acts range from the reported
instance.
2.6. Present relationships between the persons with disability and military works
Following the presence of clear evidence that deaf communicated had a constructive role to
play in the First World War.211 This means it analysing necessary exploring the current nature
of armed forces and explore that general attitude to the possibility of having persons with
bodily disabilities working within the armed forces.  It seems apparent that in as much as
working  in  the  military  professional  can  lead  to  disabilities,  it  also  remains  particularly
striking that most of the armed forces are unlikely to work with or allow the disabled persons
work with them. Actually in spite of the development in technology to invent new strategies
with means and methods of warfare the present structures of power and work relations within
the armed forces seems very reluctant to recruit persons with any forms of impairments.
3. Conclusions
In  light  of  the  above  discussions  the  following  observations  and  conclusions  have  been
reached; firstly CRPD adopts a  State based nature of human rights  obligations remains  a
challenge to apply and bind its obligations to non-state actors more so in times of armed
conflicts.  This  comprises  the applicability of  the  rights  based model  that  is  advanced for
disability  rights  under  the  CRPD when faced  with  certain  types  of  armed  conflicts.  The
limitations to a comprehensive application of the disability to all types of armed conflicts
leads to a vacuum of to contemporary applicability of the most ideals models of disability
rights while also leaves the disabled victims of especially non- international armed conflicts to
end in the most controversial and rather complicated situation that subsequently the medical
model that is fully founded. In essence at the present would imply revising and rethinking
ways of extending human rights obligations and beefing up the existing human rights treaties
relating to the rights of persons with disabilities. The above view is based on the absence of
advocacy for  the  interest  of  persons  with  disabilities  through  reliance  on  a  rights  based
implementation model under the laws of international.
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Secondly the historical aspects affected the context within which international humanitarian
law have been understood to develop overtime. This is  evidenced in type of law and the
content of these laws over a period of time. Most of the developments in history were more
centred on post World War period. This accounts to laws in the public domain to be saturated
in such a way that its content are able to meet the demands and state of needs that are required
at that point in time required point in time. The lieber code given to the American soldiers in
1893 stressed the obligations to respecting and never attacking rebel member.
Thirdly there is a conflict in the interpretative tests thus inconsistence and varied meaning are
likely to arise in most cases.  Modes of disability: based models under the CRPD were clearly
intended  to  enhance  equality;  equity  and  humanity  are  promulgated  to  persons  with
disabilities.  This  carries  with  it  the  foreseeable  concept  of  independent  all  of  which  are
enshrined under the CRPD is shown as an instrument that reformed the public domains the of
persons  with  disability  for  restoring  fairness  in  all  aspects  of  family  life.  More  so
reconsidering given persons with disabilities some room to make decisions of matters that
have a  direct  and indirect  impact  on their  day to  day livelihood.  Comparably the all  the
instruments of armed conflicts are founded on a contrary platform. In this case the concern
with  the  international  humanitarian  law  attention  is  accorded  to  the  combatants  and  the
general civilian population.  In fact there is more of a rescue. Secondly the impact that armed
conflicts and international humanitarian law are clearly taking varied stands. In view of the
developments in armed conflicts it is clear that there must be some preliminary questions have
to  be to decide so as  to degree and nature of protection that can be accorded.
Finally and yet a related aspects is the nature of relationship; In some respects these branches
of public international law may be contended to be two a complementary while as far as the
conceptual  framework  on  persons  with  disabilities  is  concerned,  both  human  rights  and
international humanitarian law seems contextually contradictory. In essence in as much as the
both  human  rights  and  international  humanitarian  law  are  derived  from  the  mainstream
argument of maintaining the fundamental humanitarian stands. In spite of some similarities in
the two areas of law on ths occasion a conclusion can be deduced from the study that remains
clearly confrontational as to how, when and why they attempt to accord protection those with
disabilities.
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